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Introduction
In the wake of the Arab Spring, many scholars and analysts have begun to look closely at
popular movements and the challenges of democratic transitions in Middle Eastern countries.
Despite the replacement of long-reigning authoritarian leaders in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, these
countries are still experiencing many difficulties in consolidating their new “democratic”
governments. Particularly, these countries have had difficulty instituting stable leadership that is
trusted both by the population and the military. While newly transitioning democracies are faced
with many different challenges such as creating democratic institutions and economic stability,
one of the greatest threats to emerging democracies today is military intervention. Egypt is an
example of a country that seems to have moved from one unpopular military leader to the next.
Despite the democratic election of President Mohammed Morsi in June 20121, a combination of
distrust in the Islamist government and their new policies led to the military coup of July 3,
2013.
Even Turkey, commonly regarded as a model for democracy in the Middle East, has seen
political unrest in the last year. In June 2013, the Gezi Park protests in the city of Istanbul shook
the country’s relatively quiet political climate. These protests represented dissatisfaction with the
AKP government from a diverse minority of voices that lack representation in the political
environment. As Nilufer Gole has noted, “the protests in Turkey were the criticism of a
democracy of the majority in defense of individual, minority voices.”2 These protests gave voice
to a quiet subset of society that is generally outnumbered by the larger, conservative population
within the country.
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However, despite these protests and the fact that the country remains geographically in
the center of the ever-increasing climate of unrest in the Middle East, Turkish democracy
remains stable and the AKP government has been able to maintain its hold on political power.
Despite media speculation that the AKP was losing significant popular support and that the
protests that occurred in Gezi Park this summer would likely manifest into a “Turkish Spring,”
the protests remained relatively small and the government was able to reassert control and quell
political unrest quickly. Instead of depicting an inherent weakness in Turkish democracy, the
Gezi Park protests may have served to provide an example of its maturity and strength.
The events of 2013 seem to presuppose the question, why Egypt and not Turkey? Given
their similar historical experiences and military relationships, why has Egypt experienced the
military removal of a democratically elected Islamist government while Turkey’s AK Party has
remained in power since 2002? This question is only more confusing considering the Turkish
military’s historical suppression of Islamist political movements before the AKP’s election.
Turkey’s strength and stability in this turbulent region is what has inspired me to research why
the Turkish military has not intervened in politics since 1980.
Preview
In this project I will review the existing literature on civil-military relations, determining
the core explanations for military intervention. I have then provided my methodology, and
identifying the case selection and justification for the use of Turkey within my project.
Following the details of my case I will provide a historical background of Turkey in order to
identify trends and factors of significance, laying the foundation for the analysis of my
hypotheses. After detailing the most important aspects of Turkey’s history I will provide my
research design where I will then highlight my dependent and independent variables as well as
3

three hypotheses for explaining non-intervention in Turkey during the AK Party era.. Through
my explained methodology I will evaluate my three hypotheses and then provide my conclusion.
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Literature Review
The study of civil-military relations has primarily focused on one concept, how to define
the relationship between the civilian government and the military establishment in order to
maintain civilian supremacy over military power. This comes with an inherent challenge: how
can you reconcile a military that is strong enough to do anything that the civilians ask of them,
with a military subordinate enough to do only what the civilians authorize them to do.3 More
specifically, this is what Peter Feaver calls the civil-military problematique. While all studies in
civil-military relations have sought to discover this perfect balance, there have been a wide
variety of proposed solutions by scholars throughout the years. These solutions vary in their
prescription of the proper civil-military relationship as well as their depth for providing an
understanding of how these relationships work with one another.
States usually gain their independence in one of two ways, either through political or
armed movement. When states win their independence through armed struggle, the military is
often stronger than the political infrastructure. In these scenarios, it becomes inherently more
difficult for the civilian government to maintain power over the military. While a strong military
is undoubtedly valued by all nations as a provider of national security, it is generally
acknowledged that it is important for the civilian polity to be able to control the military’s power.
This balance of the power between the civilian government and the military is often a fluid and
ever-changing relationship. Even though the United States is often exhibited as having an
exemplary civil-military relationship, there have been occasions throughout our history when the
military has made decisions against the directives of the civil government. The most common
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example of this would be to delay the discussion or implementation of military options in
peripheral wars.4
The idea behind civil-military relations theory is that no matter how strong the military
becomes, the civilians should remain the “political masters.”5 More specifically, there should be
a separation between military expertise and the execution of policy. Therefore, the military
should not be able to directly influence policy decisions of the civilian government, even when
the matters are related to their area of expertise. While the military may be able to develop the
appropriate responses to an identified threat in a certain level of risk, the civilian government
should be the only actor to decide the level of acceptable risk for the society.6 Therefore,
regardless of the superior nature of the military and its intelligence or expertise, a civilian
decision should always trump that of the military’s, even if it means that there was a better
option, “civilians have a right to be wrong.”7 When evaluating civil-military relations, it is
important to note that an over-balance of military influence can exist even in the absence of a
military coup; therefore a good explanation will provide an acknowledgement of this nuanced
influence and provide for measures which would allow civilians to maintain control over all the
possible areas of military influence. The relationship between civilians and the military has
become increasingly difficult to determine given the increase in the number of roles that the
military can play in a society. Instead of purely providing military defense, military forces have
come to be used for:
“construction and disaster relief…to redistribute wealth, via the defense budget, to
particular regions or corporate interests…has the ability to address questions of
4
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social injustice be leveling the playing field for disadvantaged groups,
strategically redistributing wealth and opportunity, and even coercively changing
individual attitudes (through enforced sensitivity training).”8
Illustrating just how dynamic the military’s role in society can be, it is clear that the
relationship between the military and civilian governments is constantly revolving and
will most likely continue to do so with time. Given this situation, it is time for civilians to
determine just what they want this role to be.
In this section I will review five different theories of civil-military relations. Together
they give a broad overview of the present scholarship and explore a variety of explanations and
prescriptions for the civil-military relationship. It is from these scholars theories that I have
derived my three hypotheses, which will be reviewed at the end of this section in a table. Three
of these theorists have done research that is used to study the American civil-military tradition,
while the other two have based their theories upon examinations of military relationships around
the world. Although my case study will look beyond the American civil-military tradition, it is
important that these scholars’ content be addressed in order to explain the foundation of civilmilitary relations theory, as well as to determine whether or not this traditional relationship could
be applicable in other regions of the world.
Samuel Huntington and Professionalization
Samuel Huntington’s pioneering scholarship, The Soldier and the State, served to lay the
foundation of civil-military relations theory, determining that the best way to maintain military
separation from civilian governments was through an increase of professionalization.
Huntington’s theory sought to determine a proper relationship between the military and civil-
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government through the professionalization of the military. Huntington believed that it was
professionalization that was the most important element of the civil-military relationship and
regarded expertise, responsibility, and corporate consciousness as indicators of this professional
nature.9 If the military were allowed to have a separate, autonomous sphere of influence,
Huntington believed that they would remain separate from the civilian government’s power.
Huntington supposed an inherent correlation between professionalization and subordination,
become increasingly informed and professional about their sphere of power would decrease the
likelihood that the military would try to exercise control and influence through the means of the
civilian government.
Founded on varying degrees of military professionalism, Huntington then classified two
varying styles of civilian control over military power – “objective control” and “subjective
control.” While Huntington makes it clear that “objective control” is preferable to “subjective
control” the parameters of each are fairly vague. Huntington believes that “objective control” is
best form of civilian control because it is possible to “simultaneously maximize military
subordination and military fighting power; guarantee[ing] the protection of civilian society from
external enemies and from the military themselves.”10 By increasing the military’s autonomy,
“objective control” is the most effective form of civilian control because it weakens the military
politically without degrading its ability to defend society because professionalizing the military
will cause it to become politically sterile. While this principle seems logical, clear mechanisms
for instituting this form of control are not detailed, Huntington simply relies on an assumption
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that there is an inherent link between voluntary subordination and professionalism.11 With little
parameters one can only assume that they way to achieve “objective control” would be to carry
out any policy which would further increase the autonomy of the military bureaucracy, or
professionalizing the institution through the provision of advanced technologies and training
mechanisms.
The idea of “subjective control,” equally as vague as “objective control” is defined as
anything that would increase the link between the military and civilian government. As described
by Huntington, “subjective control” is “the antithesis of objective control is military participation
in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in
institutional, class, and constitutional politics.”12 The subjective control approach would
therefore attempt to achieve control over the military by civilianizing the military – increasing
the overlap between civilian government and military institutions and powers and effectively
increasing the amount of legal and constitutional restrictions placed on the military
bureaucracy.13 Huntington sees this form of civilian control to presuppose military involvement
in civilian politics, inherently eroding the amount of control the civilian government can institute
against the military body. As Huntington states, “subjective civilian control achieves its end by
civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves
its end by militarizing the military, making them a tool of the state.”14 Thus, an increase in
military professionalization could explain non-intervention, while an increase in measures to
civilianize the military could explain military intervention.
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Believing that professionalization is the key to ensuring a strong and consolidated
military power, Huntington advocates that “objective control” represents the ideal relationship
between the civilian government and the military. In his research, Huntington stresses that the
“military officer must remain neutral politically.”15 Thus, the role of the military officer should
be treated as that of a “professional adviser to the state” but “he cannot impose decisions upon
his client which have implications beyond his field of special competence.”16 It is only after
decisions have been made by the civilian government may the military use its expertise to
formulate the means to execute it. While Huntington’s theory is one of the most widely
referenced pieces of civil-military literature, it is often criticized for its lack of applicability
outside of the United States. Other scholars have challenged Huntington’s theories on the basis
of the argument that professionalism of the military can also lead to a superiority complex over
the civilian polity, which could influence intervention.
While Huntington’s theory has laid the foundation for all future civil-military relations
scholarship, his ideas do little to describe the relationship between the military and civilians on a
daily basis and to provide clear measures that can be used to increase civilian control over the
military institution. Historically, it has not only been “unprofessional” militaries that have
overthrown civilian governments. Huntington’s theory completely fails to explain what may
happen if the military disobeys the civilian institution despite their level of relative
professionalization. Huntington’s “objective control” only works when the assumption that there
is an inherent increase in involuntary subordination with increased professionalization. Later
scholars such as Perlmutter and Finer will challenge Huntington’s simple relationship by
demonstrating further complications for creating boundaries of these relationships. Finer
15
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challenges Huntington’s idea of professionalism by asserting the possibility that the military’s
increased professionalization could then inspire it to feel superior to the existing civilian
government, and therefore more likely to involve itself in politics. Perlmutter will introduce how
the idea of the military’s perception of itself and what it is protecting can greatly impact the level
of respect the institution has for civilian supremacy.
Morris Janowitz and the Constabulary Force
Morris Janowitz has reviewed the role of changing international relationships on the
relationship between the military and civilian government. In his work, The Professional
Soldier, Janowitz looks toward the advent of nuclear weapons and the necessity of the military to
change its behavior in relation to technological advances. During the Cold War, the two great
powers the United States and the Soviet Union applied security strategies of deterrence with
limited actual war. Janowitz states that the lines between peace and war had been blurred in this
new military concept, influencing the military to view itself in a new ideal as a constabulary
force. He states, “the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is
continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable
international relations, rather than victory.”17 With this new concept, the military would look
toward the image of a police force for inspiration rather than of the warrior.
This new conceptualization has caused the military to become inherently more
politicized, necessitating a change to the nature of civilian supremacy. As evidence of this
phenomenon, Janowitz notes the centralization of national security within the civilian
government, “for example, the creation of the Department of Defense and National Security
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Council”18, with an increased effort to gain access to civilian power. The National Security
Council and Department of Defense allowed the military to have more spokes in the civilian
government than ever before. These organizations allowed the military bureaucracy to have
greater proximity to the most powerful decision-making institutions within the United States
government, and effectively increasing their presence in affairs of the White House. While this
proximity has not resulted in overarching military exercises of control as it has in other military
traditions, the U.S. military can effectively use this influence to “act as a pressure group in the
formulation of national security policy” due to an inherent respect for professional specialists.19
Furthermore, Janowitz notes, “as a pressure group the military is not a voluntary association
acting on the organs of government; on the contrary, it is an organ of government seeking to
develop new techniques for intervening in domestic politics.”20 Thus, changing technologies and
the changing role of the military has inherently politicized the military establishment, explaining
an increased intrusion of the military into the affairs of the civilian government.
While Janowitz’s theory of civil-military relations is institutional like Huntington’s, he
comes no closer to defining an alternative theory for how civilians can ensure their control on the
institutional level but states that the answer must be a greater amount of civilian oversight in
many different levels of military affairs.21 Janowitz advocates for civilian oversight of the
military establishment in order to develop standards for the military’s performance. However,
maintains that professionalization is the best means to establish civilian control. He states that
with this professionalization, the military would obey in one part because of its “meaningful
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integration with civilian values” and also because of Huntington’s notion of “self-imposed
professional standards.”22 Therefore, much of Janowitz’s prescribed solutions to this new
problem of civil-military control fall right back into the hands of Huntington’s original concept
of professionalism.
While these scholars have made significant contributions to the field of civil-military
relations, their discoveries show difficulty in their application to civil-military traditions around
the world. Like Huntington, Janowitz has little prescription to the best mechanisms, which would
allow for increased civilian control and also fail to determine the heart of the relationship
between the two institutions on a more regular basis. Although Janowitz takes account of the
increasingly political role adopted by the military as the result of changing world order, he
continues to rely on the dangerous assumption that subordination inherently follows
professionalization. While this assumption has achieved relative application in the United States,
its theory definitely does not hold up in civil-military traditions around the world. Historically,
military coups have occurred even with the existence of professional militaries. This makes it
imperative to determine new mechanisms for control and the nuances within the civil-military
relationship.
Samuel Finer
Samuel Finer attempts to take previous civil-military relations theory to another level by
addressing military identity and means of military influence in civilian politics without direct
intervention. Detailing all of the military’s means for influence, Finer’s theory begs the question,
why doesn’t the military intervene in politics more often? Being that militaries are always large
bodies with a relatively advanced system of weapons, it is surprising that they do not attempt to
exert their influence on the “weaker” civilian regime more often. Finer then points out the
22
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obvious, the military have an immensely superior organization, and they possess arms.23
Disagreeing with the arguments of both Huntington and Janowitz, Finer has maintained that the
professionalization of the military, as defined by Samuel Huntington, could serve to make the
achievement of civilian control more difficult. He hypothesizes that the military may start to
perceive themselves as closer to the state than the civilian government, allowing it to act more
decisively.24 Specifically, Finer emphasizes the “self-awareness that permits the military to
conceive that they have a unique duty, a duty of supererogation, to watch over the national
interest.”25 When a military adopts this perception, the likelihood of military involvement in
politics increases significantly. Thus, the military’s perception of their own identity can explain
military intervention.
Finer distinguishes a motive for intervention from an opportunity of military intervention.
He states that it is necessary to possess a motive, mood and opportunity in order for the military
to intervene in politics.26 Opportunities for the military to intervene are described by Finer as an
increased dependence on the military – an effect of unstable domestic circumstances, and the
popularity of the military.27. Finer believes that it is this dependence that creates a power
vacuum, and allows the military to take power over the civilian institutions.28
By highlighting the motives that the military has for intervening in politics, he further
divides his criteria into the categories of motive and mood. Dispositions to intervene that are
related to motive include: the manifest destiny of soldiers, nationalist interest, sectional interest
and mixed motives of the military.29 Dispositions to intervene that connect to mood include: self23
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importance and an elevated self-esteem of the military institution.30 Finer argues that it is these
motives that provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for military intervention.31 Finer’s
distinction between motive and mood articulate the difference between preconditions and
inaction versus preconditions and action. Finer believes that in order for the motive to transform
into actual intervention, a motive must be turned into a mood by emotion.
According to Finer, intervention is not only explained by coup d’états but can manifest
into varying levels of completeness. These four levels of completeness include: influence upon
the civilian authorities; pressures or blackmail; displacement of one civilian government for
another; or the supplantation of the civilians by a military regime.32 The level of intervention is
then dependent on the level of development of the nation’s “political culture.”33 An
underdeveloped political culture would be more likely to experience the more severe types of
intervention, where more consolidated regimes would exhibit the less severe methods. On the
other side, Finer identifies two specific weaknesses, which would disallow the military to
intervene in civilian politics. These weaknesses include a lack of political legitimacy and
inadequate technical ability to govern.34
Finer’s theory of civil-military relations goes much beyond the Huntington and Janowitz
original theories of civil-military control. Finer addresses both the preconditions and motivations
for possible military intervention, which help to explain the behaviors of militaries around the
world. In addition, Finer goes on to detail the different kinds of military disobedience that can
occur in an underdeveloped relationship that are much more widespread than simply
intervention. A detail of these variations of military intervention in civilian politics is very
30
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important because it displays the many kinds of fractions which may occur in this relationship
and allow the military to control the outcome of political decisions, even if it is behind the scenes
rather than through military rule.
Amos Perlmutter – Arbitrator Army
In a continuation of Finer’s study of the affect of military identity and the likelihood of
involvement in politics, Perlmutter focuses his research on the praetorian military traditions of
Latin American and the Middle East. Praetorianism is defined as “a situation where the military
class of a given society exercises independent political power within it by virtue of an actual or
threatened use of force.”35 In this scenario, Perlmutter is describing a political autonomy which is
enjoyed by this particular class of military and which is maintained through literal, or simply the
threat of force. He relates the number of military coups that have occurred since 1945 as
evidence that when civilian governments were neither effective nor had secure institutions, and
the executive was no longer capable of controlling the military – factors which are considered by
Perlmutter to be a precursor to Praetorianism.
Praetorianism was originally associated with the “Roman Praetorian Guard” which
exerted its influence through its “monopoly of local military power, the absence of definitive rule
of succession, and the prestige of the Roman senate.”36 However, Perlmutter distinguishes
modern Praetorianism from traditional Praetorianism, stating that modern Praetorianism is a
creation of a professional soldier. This praetorian type of military can be categorized into three
different types: autocracy, oligarchy and authoritarian praetorianism. These categories are
defined as military rule by one man; an executive comprised of primarily military men; military
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civilian-fusionist rule, respectively.37 In a country with a praetorian military, it is likely that the
military will intervene in the government and often has the potential to dominate the executive.
These militaries are most likely to develop when civilian institutions lack legitimacy either
through a lack of electoral support or an ineffective executive.38 Within this influence,
constitutional changes are common, which are written and then sustained by a military, which
plays an influential role in all political institutions.39 Therefore, a lack of governmental
legitimacy can predispose military intervention in politics.
Perlmutter states that both political and social conditions can contribute to the
development of a praetorian military society. Not all of these conditions are necessary in order to
create praetorianism, but the existence of any one of these factors will make the appearance of
praetorianism more likely. Social factors include “structural weakness or disorganization; the
existence of fratricidal classes, including a politically impotent middle class; and low levels of
social action and of mobilization of material resources.”40 The political condition of regime
vulnerability is also a determining factor of whether a praetorian structure will be able to arise.
Perlmutter believes that regime vulnerability is the major and possibly even the single condition
that propels a military to intervene in politics. He argues, “the Praetorian army tends to replace
weak and unstable political groups and regimes.”41 Specifically, Perlmutter claims that military
coups/interventions occur when: the military is the most cohesive and politically organized group
at the time, and when no more powerful opposition exists.42Therefore, the execution of a coup is
determined by a level of political readiness, the strength of the authority they wish to be replaced
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and political events.43 In sum, a political instability invites military intervention, and a repeated
intervention will lead to Praetorian control.44
Under the umbrella of Praetorian armies, Perlmutter has identified two different degrees
of military rulers, which vary in their severity of control upon the civilian establishment. These
variations include the less intrusive, arbitrator army, which still maintains a respect for existing
social order and lacks an ambition to consolidate their political power; and a more intrusive
ruling praetorian army that rejects an existing social order and has specific political aspirations.45
According to Perlmutter, the arbitrator army possess several general characteristics which
include an acceptance of social order, willingness to return to barracks when disputes are
resolved, no desire to maximize army rule and an absence of political organization, a time limit
for the institution of army rule, concern with the improvement of the military’s professionalism,
an operation or institution of control which comes from behind the scenes in the form of a
pressure group, and finally a fear of civilian retribution for their actions 46
In opposition, a ruler praetorian army possesses a general lack of respect for the existing
social order, lack of confidence in civilian rule which leaves no expectation to return to their
barracks after intervention, possession of political organization and desire to maximize civilian
rule, feeling that military rule is the only alternative to political disorder, politicized
professionalism, operation of affairs in the open and a complete lack of fear of civilian
retribution for their actions.47
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Perlmutter closes his argument by reinforcing the idea that “military government is
government by surrogate.”48 Civilian control becomes the exception, while military rule
becomes the norm, securing a political support without securing legitimacy. Perlmutter’s theory
allows the theory of civil-military relations to understand civil-military relationships in Latin
America and the Middle East where militaries have taken over politically insufficient regimes.
Pelmutter’s theory has allowed us to develop an understanding of the variation between different
types of military rule and what conditions serve as a foundation for the military’s control of
politics. While Perlmutter’s theory is helpful for understanding ruling military scenarios, his
theory offers no policy solutions to allow a civilian government to maintain control of the
military establishment.
Peter Fever – Agency Theory
Peter Feaver seeks to determine the every-day relationship between the military and
civilian government and address the civil-military problematique through the application of
agency theory. More specifically, Feaver’s theory works to determine when the military will
disobey civilian directives and how the civilian could control this phenomenon. Feaver argues
that all civil-military relations theories relate to one simple paradoxical “problematique;” that
“the institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the
polity.”49 When maintaining a military, it is imperative that the force be strong enough to protect
its civilians and to carry out necessary military duties, however, any time more power or
capabilities are given to the military establishment, their level of influence over the civilian
government in regards to power directly increases.
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Looking back at previous scholarship, Feaver highlights that Huntington looked at the
relationship between civilians and the military at an institutional level, and that his parallel
scholar, Janowitz, viewed this relationship on an individual level. While both provide valuable
outlooks to the field, Feaver argues that it is imperative to find an explanation, which can
combine both the institutional and individual elements of civil-military relations. Feaver finds
this so important because of the close relationship between the military and politics, stating that
this relationship is present on a day-to-day basis, “politics pervade civil-military relations even if
there is no coup. Politics is about deciding who gets what and how.”50 Feaver highlights the
dangers of encroaching military influence and addresses the ability of the institution to possess
undue influence over the civilian government even in the absence of direct military intervention.
Therefore, to address this lack of information, Feaver uses the principal-agent theory in
order to explain the “strategic interaction” between civilians and the military. By adapting the
economic principle-agent theory, Feaver highlights the strategic interaction and role of
punishment between the two actors. This theory helps Feaver to evaluate, “how civilians
anticipate military behavior, how military obedience itself is not foreordained, and how the
likelihood that civilians will detect and punish military misbehavior shapes interactions.”51 In
sum, Feaver’s theory evaluates the actions of the military based on what expectations they have
that the civilian government will know, or who will punish them for acting in opposition to
civilian directives.
In principle-agent theory, the employer (principle) hires a worker (agent) to do a specific
task. Once hired, the employer’s concern is then to make sure that his employee is working and
not shirking. On the other side, the employees have an incentive to do as little work as possible,
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however they will work to complete just enough work so that their employer can’t distinguish
their shirking. Feaver defines working as “doing things the ways civilians want,” and shirking as
“doing things the way those in the military want.”52
As a result of this inherent relationship, it then becomes very difficult for the employer
(principle) to determine how well their employee is performing. Thus, the theory works to
determine how the principle can influence this relationship and make sure that the employee
works, as he should.53 Therefore, Feaver says that this relationship is a strategic interaction
carried out within a hierarchical setting. Strategic interaction is used because “the choices
civilians make are contingent on their expectations of what the military is likely to do, and vice
versa.”54 This level of uncertainty creates an inherent necessity for both sides to take calculated
risks in the hope of achieving the optimal results.
While the military would frequently have similar preferences and outlooks as civilian
leaders, “it may not share identical preference with the civilians on all policy questions and so
may seek to manipulate the relationship so as to prevail in policy disputes. Therefore, the
military can have the ability and incentive to respond strategically to the demands of the civilian
population in order to control decisions, an example of shirking rather than working.55 If the
military does shirk, the civilians still hold the ability to punish the agent if they discover the
presence of shirking. Furthermore, the actions ultimately taken by the military are shaped by how
strongly they disagree with a civilian prescription to a situation, how likely they expect civilians
to find out, and what the severity of their punishment for their disobedience could be. Feaver
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describes this inherent uncertainty, “the civilians cannot be sure that the military will do what
they want; the military agents cannot be sure that the civilians will catch and punish them if they
misbehave.”56
The principle can exert his control over the agent in two, nonobvious ways: by providing
incentives for good performance or through the means of monitors. Within the literature on
principle-agent relations, there is either the position that: “agents work when monitored and shirk
when not monitored” or, that “optimal compliance comes from improving the quality of the
agent and bringing the agent’s preferences more closely in line with those of the principal.”57
Civilian means of monitoring the military establishment have a number of possibilities
and range greatly in their degrees of intrusiveness on military autonomy. This control could
materialize in many different ways ranging from contract incentives, screening and selection of
armed forces, fire alarms, institutional checks, police patrols or revising delegation decision.
Feaver notes a delicate line which civilians must find between being too relaxed with their
military and being overly intrusive. As Feaver states,
“overmeddling could so jeopardize the lives of the military, or the fate of the
mission…overdelegation would be the least burdensome and would avoid a de
jure coup, but it would amount to a de facto coup: the military would be deciding
policy and making decisions that by the rights belong to the civilian political
masters.”58
When the civilian government exerting control over the budget or doctrine, it gives
civilians the opportunity to know something about the likely activities of the military without
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directly having to observe their actions.59 Additionally, the civilians may restrict the scope of
delegation to the military, empowering their body to do a greater amount of the delegation of
issues related to military missions. On a slightly more intrusive level, the civilian government
can attempt to control the participants in the armed forces through screening and selection
mechanisms. If the government has control over which agents they allow into the military, then
they can more closely shape the feelings of the military. Finally, most intrusively, the military
could use a third party agent to report on key outputs, institutional checks on the armed forces,
called “fire alarms.”60
Closely linked to the principal-agent theory is the idea of contractual incentives; in a
military context, Feaver gives the example of the civilian polities’ promise to give the military an
increased level of autonomy from the government, recognizing that the military institution would
prefer to run with a minimal amount of interference.61 This notion of autonomy of the military
sector is supported by a wide variety of scholars from Huntington in his ideal type of objective
control to his critics, Finer and Carl von Clausewitz.
Finally, Feaver importantly highlights the punishment that a civilian government can
exert on the military forces as a consequence for shirking the civilian directives. Punishment
capabilities of the civilian leadership can take the form of imposing disliked monitoring
provisions, cutting military budgets, “forced detachments” from the military, military justice
within the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or extralegal action taken against specific military
personnel 62 Thus, increased mechanisms of civilian oversight and monitoring capabilities can
explain a lack of military intervention in politics. While Feaver only applies this principle-agent
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theory to the tradition of the United States, I believe that it may help to describe the nature of
other militaries around the world due to a general characterization of the military’s tendency to
either work for or shirk civilian directives.
Conclusion
The previous five theories of civil-military relations provide a broad foundation of
scholarship to which I can use to analyze my case study of the Turkish civil-military relationship.
From even this small review of civil-military relations scholarship, it is evident that a wide
variety of explanations on the subject exist. However, I believe these theorists lay the most
diverse and interesting foundation for explaining the Turkish military tradition. Later, my
hypotheses will connect back to this scholarship to determine which explanation best fits the
Turkish case. In the following section, I will begin with an overview of the Turkish civil-military
relationship from the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
Below is a table, which reviews the independent variables I have gathered from the
previous literature review and their corresponding hypotheses that I have tested in my project.

Independent Variable

Corresponding Hypothesis

Constitutional Separation

When there is strong constitutional separation
between the military and the government, the
military will not intervene in politics.

Likelihood of Military Punishment

When there is a likelihood/capacity for the
civilian government to punish the military for
disobedience, the military will not intervene in
politics.

Identity of the Nation

When there is a threat to the identity of the
nation, the military will intervene in politics.
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Methodology
To evaluate my research puzzle: “why has the military not intervened in politics?” I will
conduct a single-country case study on Turkey. Through this project I attempt to gain an
understanding of the degree of importance which civil-military relations can have on a country’s
ability to democratically consolidate. Theorists of democratization in the third world and
democratic consolidation alike have long studied what measures threaten the stability of
emerging democracies. Among variables like economic success and fragmentation of the
population, the challenge or overthrow of civilian authority by the military is consistently noted
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as one of the largest threats to democratic stability. Furthermore, recent scholarship from
Gasiorowski and Power has found that economic factors have come to play a far less prominent
role in the democratic transitions of third-wave democracies than it did in the two previous
waves of democratic transition.63 For countries that are a part of this third wave, then, it would
seem that the other pressing factors of democratic transition and consolidation and transition like
the role of the military have played a much more important role.
This phenomenon has proved to be true especially in Middle Eastern countries like
Turkey and Egypt who were established with a strong military leadership and who have
struggled maintain democratic governments with continued military interventions. While Egypt
still struggles to achieve democracy today, having seen their most recent military coup in 2013,
Turkey has been more successful.

During the last decade, various scholars and journalists have viewed Turkey as a model
for democratization in the Middle East,64 and its path toward democratization has been studied
by many. One particularly important aspect of Turkey’s ability to further democratize its
government has been consolidating control over the military establishment through various
constitutional reforms. However, due to a lack of scholarship which directly connects civilmilitary relations to democratic consolidation, it is unclear exactly which variables should be
examined. Given this lack of information, it only makes sense to begin looking for causes of this
relationship within a single country first. By examining one tradition closely, I will be able to
identify crucial variables, which could then later be tested in application to similar countries.
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For the purpose of this research, I have made the assumption that the AKP government in
Turkey represents a democratic system of government. While Turkey undoubtedly has room for
further democratization, especially in regards to the freedom of the press, it still maintains one of
the world’s democracies. This assumption can be made primarily from the existence of frequent,
free and fair elections.
In this project I have collected data to support my hypotheses through the evaluation of
primary sources, speeches, newspaper articles and professional studies and opinion polls on the
region. These sources have allowed me to look closely into the country’s constitutional reforms
as well as at the rhetoric of various important leaders in the country. In the next section I will
provide an overview of the research design for this project.

Case Study
Scholars of democratic consolidation have highlighted military intervention as one of the
largest threats to emerging democracies around the world. This threat is particularly pertinent to
those democracies, which are considered to be a part of the “third wave” of democratic
consolidation.65 Countries not only in the Middle East, but also in Latin America and Asia have
struggled with military intervention in developing democratic governments, hindering their
success and development. Recently, the Arab Spring countries have been faced with the advent
of military intervention since replacing the long-standing authoritarian regimes in the region. The
most recent example of this phenomenon was seen in the summer of 2013, when the Egyptian
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government removed the democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi on June 3, 2013.
Many scholars recognize that this military coup will not only place the will of the people in
danger, but also keep the country at arms-length from achieving democracy. Furthermore,
Turkey is an important country to evaluate due to its geographical location as a bridge between
Western and Middle Eastern values and its strong relationship with the United States.
The study of civil-military relations is extremely important in order to provide
understanding of the governments around the world. While it may not seem like the topic carries
much weight in consolidated democracies such as the United States, or the United Kingdom, the
relationship between the military and the civilian government has played a crucial role in
countries around the world and can even become a roadblock to further democratization.
Theorists of democratization in the third world and democratic consolidation alike have long
studied what measures threaten the stability of emerging democracies. Among variables like
economic success and fragmentation of the population, civil-military relations are noted as
having a considerable impact on the ability of a country to strengthen their democratic process.66
Furthermore, recent scholarship from Gasiorowski and Power has found that economic factors
have come to play a far less prominent role in the democratic transitions of third-wave
democracies than it did in the two previous waves of democratic transition.67.
Since it is becoming clear that factors other than the economy are playing an important
role to democratic transition, it is important to further study other areas of impact. Given that the
role of the military has historically been determined as a crucial factor to democratization, it is
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imperative that the role of civil-military relations be given more attention in studies of
democratic consolidation.
Currently, a significant amount of scholarship focuses on whether or not Turkey can be
seen as a model for democracy for Muslim-majority countries, however much less scholarship
has recognized the country’s success in achieving the successful separation of the military from
politics. Despite the importance that a number of democratic consolidation theorists give to a
successful separation of the military from politics, there is little scholarship that has given
detailed attention to this particular aspect of development as a means for moving toward
democratic governments in the Middle East. Given the Middle East’s deficit in democratic
systems of government, it seems only logical to focus on this particular measure as a means for
ensuring lasting democratic governments in the future.
Finally, this project seeks to define a framework in which civilian control over the
military can effectively be achieved within the field of comparative politics. Upon finding
indicators of success, this theory could hopefully be applied to other countries in the region, and
even possibly around the world, who currently strive to establish strong and enduring democratic
systems of government.
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Case Selection
In order to better understand the impact of military political autonomy on civilian
democratization I will evaluate Turkey in a single-country case study. In recent years, Turkey
has been widely regarded as a model for democratic transition in the Middle East. Although the
country’s past includes three direct military interventions, it has made enormous strides in
democratization in recent years. This democratic consolidation is thought to be the result of the
country’s continued desire to enter the European Union. While the country’s accession to the
European Union is not the primary focus of this study, the reforms that it has helped the country
instate are very important for understanding the end of military tutelage within the country. This
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project will examine aspects of Turkey’s policymaking that led to the instatement of civilian
control over the military.
For the purpose of this research, I have made the assumption that AKP administration in
Turkey represents a democratic system of government. This assumption is made with the
recognition of Turkey’s continued challenges in furthering its democratic values as well as its
less democratic aspects. Despite the country’s challenges to further democratic consolidation, the
Turkish government holds regular, free and fair elections to determine their elected officials,
indicating their democratic nature.

Research Design
In this project I have evaluated the explanation of military non-intervention in Turkey
during the AK Party era. As has been noted in my historical section, the Turkish military has
historically viewed themselves as the guardians of Kemalist principles, and has not hesitated to
ensure the traditional identity of the country through military intervention. Representing
conservative and Islamic values, as well as working to increase religious freedom within the
country since their election, it seems odd that the military wouldn’t have moved to expunge the
AKP from power. Intervention seems increasingly likely when considering the military’s
relationship to past Islamic governments and political parties.
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Dependent Variable
To examine this phenomenon, my dependent variable is military non-intervention. While
my literature review has made clear that the military may “intervene” in civilian politics in a
number of ways, I will focus solely on military interventions that directly imposed forcible
regime change. I will determine when this will occur by noting a change of the leadership, which
was imposed either through coup d’état.
Independent Variables
To determine why the military will not have intervened when it was otherwise expected
of them to do so, I will look at several independent variables, which I have determined from my
literature review on civil-military relations theory. These variables include, the respect of law,
the fear of punishment and the protection of national identity.
Respect of Constitution
A respect for the constitution is an important variable to test when evaluating civilmilitary relations because it will determine whether or not constitutional reform, and a more
articulated government can have an effect on the power of the military establishment. Many
scholars, such as Finer and Perlmutter have indicated a connection to the strength and legitimacy
of the government and the likelihood of military intervention. As civilian governments have
consolidated their power, especially through the processes of democratic consolidation, the
expansion of constitutional law has been common. Constitutional reforms are also an imperative
measure for research given the fact that constitutional reforms have often been used by the
military in order to expand their influence within civilian institutions. Furthermore, the
imposition of constitutional reforms has been a noted factor in previous scholars of civil-military
relations theory. In Huntington’s prescription for the ideal civil-military relationship, “objective
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control,” constitutional reform would be deemed a measure of the less desirable “subjective
control.” By disallowing the maximum amount of anonymity to the military establishment,
constitutional reforms would be seen as a means that would precede military intervention.
Despite Huntington’s disfavor of constitutional reform, other scholars such as Janowitz, Finer
and Perlmutter have encouraged an increase in civilian oversight as a means of establishing the
government’s authority. In contrast to Huntington, these scholars have noted a correlation
between a weak government and lack of civilian authority with an increase in military
intervention. This is mainly the result of the military’s lack of confidence in the civilian regime
to be able to maintain control of the state.
Through the examination of this hypothesis, I would expect to see a decrease in military
disobedience (intervention) with the implementation of stronger and more consolidated
constitutional reforms. I will be able to determine whether the military has a respect for law by
evaluating their changed behaviors after the imposition of various constitutional reforms, which
specifically target the breadth of military power within the country. If military intervention were
to continue after these targeted reforms, it would be clear that a respect for law is not a factor for
the lack of military intervention. However, if there is a lack of military intervention after the
imposition of constitutional reforms, a respect for the law of the country could be one of the
factors preventing military intervention even when it would have seemed likely for a particular
country’s military tradition.
Punishment
The fear of punishment is another important, but largely overlooked theory in civilmilitary relations. Measuring a degree of the fear of punishment within the military would
ascertain whether or not military intervention, and therefore agent disobedience, is increasingly
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likely when the civilian government, the principal, has a lack of institution to monitor the
military’s behavior and punish them for disobedience. In the history of civil-military relations we
have seen the military overthrow civilian regimes numerous times. However, despite the fact that
the military has often interfered in democratically elected governments, there have been very few
times where the military has been punished for their acts of disobedience by the civilian
government. While this phenomenon is distinctly rare, it would seem that the likelihood that the
civilian government could hold the military accountable for its actions would decrease the
likelihood that he military would disobey or interfere with civilian government establishments.
According to agency theory, the agent will shirk his duties to the benefit of himself as long as he
knows that the principal could not detect/punish his shirking. However, when increased methods
of monitorization and institutions for punishment for mal-behavior are instituted, the agent will
perform more to the desire of the principal in order to avoid punishment. While this is a new idea
in the field of civil-military relations I believe that it is an imperative mechanism to review as a
means for increasing civilian authority in countries with powerful military establishments.
Through the examination of this hypothesis, I would expect to see a decrease in military
disobedience following the implementation of trials of military officials and other means of
punishment. I have tested whether or not the institution of civilian monitoring and punishment
mechanisms will affect military behavior if there is a correlation between these mechanisms and
a lack of military intervention. If there is a lack of intervention following the institution of these
mechanisms, then one could assume that there is a relationship between civilian punishment and
military behavior.
National Identity
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Finally, I have tested the military’s perceived duty to protect the nation as a cause for
military intervention in civilian politics. According to the work of Amos Perlmutter, the
military’s perception of its role can be a determinant of the military’s behavior. Rebecca Schiff
also looks toward country’s historical civil-military relationships as the determinant of which
kinds of civil-military relationships will be successful in a given country.68 Many countries with
strong military establishments have long-lasting traditions of military leaders and sometimes, a
state’s independence would not have been achieved without the help of the military. In these
nations, the military will be likely to intervene in civilian politics when it feels that the integrity
of the nation is at risk.
Through the examination of this hypothesis I would expect to see a correlation between a
rise in perceived threats to the founding principles of the country and military intervention in
politics. I have tested whether or not the integrity of the nation has inspired the military to
intervene if an intervention has occurred in relation to a regime’s changing of laws, which
reflected the nation’s identity. If laws were changed which could have “threatened” this national
integrity before the military intervened than this would appear likely. In addition, if the military
establishment published statements, which alluded to this concern before a coup occurred, it
would appear that this explanation would have some correlation to the likelihood of military
intervention in these types of governments.
In this section I have provided a detailed account of this paper’s research methods. I will
evaluate the independent variables of constitutional separation, punishment and national identity
in order to explain military non-intervention during Turkey’s AK Party era. In my next section I
will examine my first hypothesis for non-intervention, constitutional separation.
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Birth of Turkish Republic
In this section I will describe the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, drawing
special attention to the role of Atatürk in the development of the nation state and modern
reforms, the mixed role of the military from the creation of the country and the conditions which
have proceeded the military coups that the country would face in the future.
The role of the military in Turkish history began even before the Ottoman Empire entered
the world stage. As early as the eighth and ninth centuries in Central Asia, the Turks were a
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military before they became a nation, surviving by their ability to conquer land.69 Later, the
Ottoman Empire was developed through pure military conquest. During the 17th and 18th
centuries the empire invested time and resources in developing and improving the quality their
armed forces. As part of a military modernization project, Ottoman military personnel were sent
for training to European countries, leading to the push for westernization and the implementation
of European legal codes and written constitutions.70 It was this new elite class of military
personnel trained in academies, among them Mustafa Kemal, that became the founders of the
new Turkish Republic.
The Turkish military continued to play a dominant role in politics from the founding of
the republic in 1923 until the 1990s, when the country began to take serious measures of reform
in the hopes of achieving accession into the European Union. The role of the military has
steadily declined during the first decade of the 21st century with AKP leadership. While the role
of the military is not as comprehensive as it once was, their role in modern politics is still very
significant due to the long-lived relationship between the military and the citizens of the Turkish
state. Although the military has historically held a strong relationship with the Turkish
population, various developments such as the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, and modern
attempts to influence political outcomes such as the post-modern coup of 1997 and the ememorandum of 2007 have led to a significant increase in civilian distrust of the military. Recent
developments such as the Erbakan investigations have served to damage the military’s allpowerful influence within the country by marking the first occasion a civilian government has
tried the military for its actions in court.
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The story of modern Turkey largely begins at the end of the First World War. Forced to
pay the price for choosing allegiance with the losing side of the war, the Ottoman Empire,
already in steep decline, found itself waiting for the Allied powers to divide the country however
it saw fit. The Treaty of Serves intended to divide the national territory in order to allow for the
creation of an independent Armenian Republic in the east and an autonomous Kurdish region in
the southeast. The remainder of the country was to be divided between the Italians, Greeks and
French. Finally, the straits and Constantinople were to be demilitarized and placed under
international control.71 The thought of letting the once prestigious Ottoman Empire be
partitioned by colonial powers of the West inspired members of the fragmented Ottoman army to
organize rebel forces. While the treaty was never ratified or implemented, it remains implanted
in the Turkish national memory and is the root of Turkey’s powerful concern with its “territorial
integrity.” In addition, the treaty has often been mentioned by suspicious nationalists who
believe that Europe still harbors a secret agenda to partition modern Turkey.72
At the heart of the creation of modern day Turkey lies Mustafa Kemal, commonly known
as “Atatürk,” the father of the Turks. It is important to note that the man who is credited with
establishing the Republic and creating the founding principles of the nation also came from a
strong military background. When he was 12 he began training at his local military school. He
then moved to the military academy in Istanbul, where he graduated his training in 1905.73
Throughout his military career, Atatürk served in the Ottoman Army in Libya against the Italians
and in the Balkan Wars; however, his infamous military reputation was crystallized when he
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successfully repelled the Allied invasion at the Dardanelles in 1915.74 It was in 1919 that Atatürk
began to work on the nationalist revolution. He organized a resistance against the settlement
imposed by the Allied forces. The first congress of the eastern nationalists was held in Erzurum
on July 23, 1919 where Kemal was elected the president of the Society for Defense of Rights,
which framed a set of principles for the resistance movement. These principles encompassed two
distinct ideas. The first principle advocated total rejection of any foreign intervention in the form
of a mandate or a protectorate; the second espoused the indivisible nature of the state within its
national frontiers.75 Atatürk was considered to have numerous qualifications for this leadership
position based upon his military career: “he had built up a brilliant record of solid military
accomplishment.”76 Most notable was his defense of Gallipoli from invading forces. In April of
1915, units commanded by Mustafa Kemal held fast defending the Dardanelles and Gallipoli
against a British-led Allied assault. Atatürk’s reputation held true, and despite the disparity in
military strength between the two armies, the Turkish military was able to wipe out entire units
in the defense of the territory. The revolution’s persistent resistance led to the forced evacuation
of Allied troops by January 1919.77
In July of 1920, Atatürk announced his resignation from the Ottoman army with the
intention of pursuing political office. He stated that to continue his military career would impede
his service to the nation, and that he would continue the struggle in the [government] as an
individual fighter78 His decision was significant because it noted that at times, political and
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military functions could not legitimately or effectively be combined79 In addition, his actions
inspired other commanders to follow in his footsteps. Some scholars mark this as Atatürk’s first
stand for the separation of the military from politics.80 This call for the separation between the
military and political realm is an important declaration of what the relationship between these
two actors should look like within the newly developed nation-state.
Due to the lack of progress among the fragmented Ottoman empire forces, Sultan
Vahdettin’s representatives signed the Treaty of Serves on August 10, 1920, marking their
decision not to fight the Allied forces any longer. However, despite doubts about the progress
within resistance movements, Kemal’s forces began to see gains in 1921. The government of
France’s decision to move away from the Allied forces and sign the Ankara agreement with the
Turks on October 21, 1921 was an indication of their success. This Ankara agreement served as a
peace treaty, which recognized the nationalist government.81 In 1921 Kemal established a
provisional government in Ankara, and the following year, the Ottoman Sultanate was formally
abolished.82 Atatürk’s military legacy was sealed when his forces were able to successfully resist
Greek attempts to seize Smyrna. Greek occupation officially ended in 1922 when Atatürk’s
troops entered the city. This victory is what allowed him to obtain revision of the peace
settlement in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.83
The final Turkish offensive was launched on August 26, 1922, and as soon as September
9, Atatürk entered Izmir at the head of a convoy that was applauded by the Turkish population.
Atatürk carries a legacy, which still has a very strong presence within modern day Turkey. The
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Turkish population is not slow to recognize that the Turkish Republic would not exist without
the work of Atatürk, who rallied the remainder of the Ottoman forces and defended the territory
from the Allied forces despite a significant disparity in the strength and modernization of the two
militaries.84 The country’s ability to withstand the territorial threats of the Allied powers through
the military has instituted a strong and lasting perception of the necessity to defend the territorial
integrity of the nation.
Once the Allied forces had left the country, the Turkish resistance forces began to prepare
for the republic’s coming independence. Signed during July 1923, the Lausanne Treaty marked
the independence and sovereignty of the Turkish nation-state. Formally declaring themselves a
sovereign republic on October 29, 1923, the Turks found themselves a war-torn republic. Years
spent fighting the Allied forces after the end of World War I and the mass exodus of the GreekTurkish population left the republic with a damaged country that needed a new beginning;
everything would have to be rebuilt: “the Turkish Republic was an outcome of two struggles: an
anti-colonial struggle against western imperialism; and a national bourgeois revolution against
the traditional Ottoman order and a social revolution against the traditional Ottoman order and its
dominant social forces.”85 The existence of this military struggle from the beginning of the
Republic, and its ability to help found the nation’s independence allowed the military to gain
significant prestige and popularity from the very beginning of the Republic. This prestige and
popularity would then continue throughout Turkey’s modern history, only to be hindered for the
first time in the late 1990s.
Due to its vast prestige from leading the state’s National Liberation struggle and
experience with state administration, Mustafa Kemal’s military-civilian bureaucracy controlled
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the state apparatus since the founding of the Turkish state and laid the foundation for a military
force which would remain deeply involved in Turkish politics for many years to come.86 The
Kemalist republic drew its inspiration from the Soviet and French models, adopting an
authoritarian, single-party rule and a statist economy from the Soviets and a strict concept of
secularism and centralized nation-state where citizenship was based upon the rights of the
individual from the French.87 Although a Turkish nationalist, Kemal believed that Turkey could
only regain its power by becoming a part of the west through industrialization and
secularization.88
In order to achieve the level of modernization, Westernization and secularization that
Kemal desired, many constitutional reforms were implemented from 1923 to 1945 that
fundamentally changed the nature of the Republic. The Republic’s first full constitution was
enacted in April 1924, and inside it contained many of Atatürk’s famously radical reforms. First
and foremost Kemal worked to abolish the caliphate and declare the new state a secular republic
(1923). Kemal enforced a move from eastern to western attire as a symbolic rejection of the past,
outlawing the fez and any attire specific to the religion of Islam (1925). Law 667 declared in
1925, abolished the Tarikat (religious order), covenants and recluses. The abolishment of Tarikat
led to the relocation of a large class of unemployed religious and quasi religious agents of
obscurantism and conservatism into the small town and rural communities in Turkey.” These
large populations of religious individuals were able to maintain their Islamic traditions in the
rural communities of Turkey, eventually leading to the development of Islamic political parties
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in the nineties. These men who mainly became imams and Qu’ran teachers then instilled feelings
of hatred and distrust for the government in this rural communities.89
Atatürk and his associates studied the civil codes of Europe, and the government
eventually decided to implement the Swiss Civil Code as the foundation of the new Turkish
Republic. The Swiss Civil Code seemed the most fitting application of law given its strong
symbolic tie to Western democracy and civilization. Shortly after a Turkish penal code was also
implemented, using the Italian Penal Code as a model (1926).90 These laws helped to secularize
and homogenize all legal procedures within the country. Among other measures the civil code
served to abolish polygamy and establish complete equality between men and women in terms of
inheritance and the guardianship of children. Like many of the reforms in the new Turkish
republic, after the implementation of the civil code, women’s participation in public affairs and
social-professional life developed rapidly within the cities but was very limited in the small
towns and villages of rural Turkey. As with many aspects of the Kemalist movement, many
scholars note the unsuccessful attempt to integrate these ideas throughout the country, leaving
many of the larger cities under the influence of Kemalism, while rural areas never fully
integrated themselves into the new system.91
Closely following the implementation of the Swiss Civil Code, Atatürk quickly replaced
the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet in 1928. The Turkish language, originally a mixture of
Turkish, Arabic and Persian, soon became a symbol of nationalism against the cosmopolitan
nature of the Ottoman state and language. Seeing themselves as the most Western movement
within Turkish society at the development of the Turkish state, the military/bureaucratic class
deeply influenced the abolition of the Arabic script and language because of its connection to the
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old Ottoman state.92 To the military bureaucracy the modernization movement was to be like the
West and Arabic was seen as nothing but a symbolic tie to the traditional East. Later, Atatürk
forced everyone to take a surname, upon which Kemal was given his most widely known name,
Atatürk, meaning “father of the Turk’s” (1934).
Atatürk’s sweeping westernization of Turkey was achieved rapidly through constitutional
reforms. By conducting the reforms as quickly as possible, Kemal gave dissidents of his policies
no time to crystallize an opposing position.93 The military that so greatly assisted Kemal in the
establishment of the republic in 1923 also played a large and influential role in implementing
Kemalist reforms and principles, which were aimed at modernizing and westernizing the
country.94 “The military is considered to be a highly effective instrument of modernization,”95
and Atatürk’s formation of the Turkish Republic proves this statement to carry some weight.
“The officer corps played a particularly important part in the national effort to achieve modernity
through top-down mobilization.96 From the beginning of the Republic, the Turkish Armed forces
have taken upon themselves the task of safeguarding Kemalist reforms and have historically
interfered in politics only when they felt these principles were at risk. Atatürk’s government used
the army as an instrument of education, social mobilization and nation building. Practically allyoung men were required to perform military service in the new republic, serving from 18
months to three years.
While many admired Atatürk, his contemporaries did not always like him. He never
hesitated to impose his will by force, and he never sought compromise because he was convinced
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that he was right. Any criticism against him was taken to be treason.97 This dislike of Atatürk’s
leadership style is what possibly led to the potential coup plot against him in 1926. In the early
days of the republic, in 1926 Atatürk discovered a plot to assassinate him among some of his
fellow commanders. Suspects were arrested and their confessions were extracted but Atatürk
also took the opportunity to expel all individuals who had expressed discontent with his
leadership style. Hundreds are believed to have been victim to Kemal’s tribunals.98 This threat
ultimately led him to pass a new law, which would formerly make membership within the
National Assembly incompatible with active military service.
One of Atatürk’s main goals was to keep the army out of politics, and indeed some of his
rhetoric would assert this assumption. In a speech delivered to the Grand National Assembly in
1927, Atatürk stated, “Commanders, while thinking of and carrying out the duties and
requirements of the army, you must take care not to let political considerations influence their
judgment. They must not forget that there are other officials whose duty it is to think of political
aspects. A soldier’s duty cannot be performed with talk and politicking.”99 These statements
clearly reflect Atatürk’s firm belief in the separation of the military from politics, yet, unlike
other aspects of Atatürk’s founding vision that the military seems to adhere to with absolute
preciseness, they seem to have ignored this particular tenant of Atatürk’s wishes.
However, critics have highlighted various hypocritical policy implementations and
leadership appointments during Atatürk’s leadership, which would indicate that he might not
have been as committed to this separation as some, would believe. As with many Turkish laws,
while in theory a law is supposed to function a particular way, the practice of the law can be
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quite different; “until 1924, a number of senior army officers combined active commands in the
forces with political careers as members of the Grand National Assembly.”100 This dichotomy
gives a basis to question Atatürk’s commitment to his statements about military separation from
political decisions.
Constitutional reforms , which were intended to institute a separation between the
military and state politics, were initiated by Kemal Atatürk as early as 1923. Legal and
constitutional changes made by the new republic sought to separate serving officers from the
parliament. Law 385, passed in December 1923 declared that in future elections, officers and
soldiers would be obligated to resign from the forces before their election as deputies could be
validated. When the Caliphate was abolished in 1924, the Chief of General Staff was deprived of
his previous seat in the cabinet, making him directly responsible to the President and bypassing
the Ministry of Defense.101
In 1930, an article was added to the Military Penal Code which declared that military
personnel that “assembled together for political objectives, join political parties, participate in
political demonstrations, meetings, or elections, or in any manner whatsoever make oral
suggestions about these objectives, or write political articles or make speeches to this effect, shall
be imprisoned for up to five years.”102 Later, article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law
of 1935 stated that the “duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland
and the Republic of Turkey, as determined in the Constitution.”103 It is the wording of this
particular law, which is also present in the Republic’s constitution of 1961, were repeated by the
leaders of coups or other military interventions in politics to justify their actions.
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As a result of his strains in office and heavy drinking, Atatürk died from cirrhosis of the
liver in 1938.104 “Today, Turkey attributes everything that is deemed modern in the state to
Kemal.” While Kemal led many momentous reforms within the country, his death in the midst of
the young republic left the population struggling to actualize the man’s idealized images with
difficult realities. The People’s Republican Party (Atatürk) dominated national politics as a
single party until 1945.105 Kemal was succeeded by Ismet Inönü, who ruled as a member of the
RPP until 1945 elections.
Since the founding of the Republic, the Turkish Armed Forces have played an
instrumental role in defending the secular nature and Kemalist principles of the Turkish republic.
Historically, the military has not hesitated to intervene whether in the direct form of a coup or the
indirect form of speeches and political pressure when it feels that the current government is
moving too far from the Kemalist principles or secularism. Given the Turkish Armed forces role
as protectors of the Kemalist regime, historically they did not hesitate from intervening in the
political sphere when they felt that the integrity of the nation was in danger. However, this has
also meant that the military has distanced itself and allowed for the expansion of civilian
supremacy when they were not worried about the regime.
The Turkish military’s presence in politics has also been dependent on how the military
perceives internal threats to security. The most prevalent security threats, which have triggered
military involvement in more recent history, have been separatist Kurdish nationalism and the
rise of Political Islam.106 Kurdish nationalism and their separatist movement are considered to
threaten the “territorial integrity” of the country and political Islam threatens the secular
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foundation of the Turkish republic. For both of these reasons, military intervention in the
political realm has been justified under the constitution until more recent history. The Kurdish
issue and role of Islam in society will continue to play a role throughout Turkish history and play
important roles in the military coup d’états of 1960, 1971 and 1980.

Three Military Coups: 1960, 1971 and 1980
Throughout the course of Turkish history, there have been three military interventions.
Each of these interventions influenced Turkish society by bringing new constitutional reforms
and determining new roles for the military establishment with each new coup. As expressed in
the preceding section, the Turkish Armed Forces have played an integral role in the
establishment and maintenance of the Turkish Republic, viewing themselves as the guardians of
Atatürk’s founding principles. The inherently close relationship between the military and the
foundation of the Turkish Republic has created the basis for Turkey’s complicated history of
military involvement in politics. While each of these coups has meant overshadowing civilian
political leadership, it is important to note the short duration of each military coup. Each
intervention by the Turkish military has been very short in duration, and there has been a timely
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return to civilian rule. This being said, after each coup, the Turkish military was given various
“exit guarantees,” measures which expanded the sphere of the military’s influence on politics.107
These exit guarantees were secured through either the institutional or non-institutional influences
that the military possessed over civilian politics. Institutional influences were usually
incorporated by law and include the establishment of the National Security Council in order to
allow for the military to directly advise the government on crucial issues. Non-institutional
mechanisms for influence were not dictated within law but deal with the cultural influence the
military holds over the civilian population and can utilize through unofficial speeches given by
military members of the National Security Council, which have discussed issues like the Kurdish
question.108
In this section I focus on the country’s coup d’états in order to determine their
characteristics and variables of influence, allowing me to determine patterns of behavior.
Determining the conditions of each military coup will allow me to determine when the military is
likely to intervene, and to identify periods when one would have expected military intervention,
but did not see it.
Military Coup of 1960
The military’s first interference in domestic politics occurred after the formation of the
first multi-party democracy in 1946. The change to a multi-party state occurred under the
leadership of President Ismet Inönü and marked the most far-reaching change to Turkey’s
politics since the foundation of the Republic; this reform was so influential because “the end of
the single-party state broke [the military’s] symbolic relationship with the regime.”109 During the
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precious single-party period of Turkish history, the military played an integral role in protecting
Atatürk and his party, who were very wary of opposing forces within the country. The allowance
of an opposition party created the Democratic Party, which served to represent “the urban poor,
commercial middle classes, religious conservatives and the rural population.”110 For the first
time, Turkey had a government of divided politics, an idea that was most certainly more
uncomfortable for the military establishment given their previous role in maintaining a one-party
government since the founding of the Republic.
Following the dissolution of Inönü’s leadership, the Democratic Party was elected with
the Prime Minister of Adnan Menderes. The new Democratic Party began to express an
increased number of religious sentiments. In addition, the party’s Prime Minister Menderes used
his leadership position to interfere with appointments and promotions within the military. He
“alienated the officer corps by basing promotions on personal loyalty to his party,”111 a decision
which would later prove troublesome. Throughout Menderes’ leadership, Turkey experienced a
great deal of economic and sociopolitical turmoil. Economically, Turkey was experiencing
difficulties directly related to diminishing aid from the United States, which had been provided
to them through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine.112 The increasing authoritarian
nature of the Democratic Party and continued protests by university students finally led to the
military’s first intervention on May 27, 1960.
Once civilian rule was restored, a revised constitution was implemented in 1961 under
strong influence of the military leadership. This new constitution served to extend social rights
to citizens and expand civil liberties. However, the constitution limited the power of elected
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bodies by creating a system of checks and balances. One of the most crucial results of the 1961
Constitution was that it institutionalized the guardianship of the military by establishing the
National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Konseyi- MGK), permitting the military to
communicate their views on policy to civilian politicians.”113 The Chief of General Staff was
now directly responsible to the Prime Minister rather than the Secretary of Defense. This allowed
the military to expand its influence over decision making on issues of national security, causing
the MGK to become the most powerful apparatus that the military could use to exert its influence
on political decisions.
When evaluating Turkey’s fist coup several factors become clear. Most prominently, it is
easy to see that the coup was short-lived, and that the military restored civilian order to the
government very quickly. The military took power of the government on May 27, 1960, and
handed the leadership back to the civilians in October 1961. In addition, the intervention
coincided with significant economic hardship within the country. The intervention also occurred
in tandem with an environment of sociopolitical conflict – the government was exhibiting harsh
and authoritarian measures upon the public, who continued to protest despite the government’s
hard-handed response. Finally, the coup occurred when the government was promoting and
integrating more Islamic/religiously oriented political reforms. Even though these reforms were
popular among large amounts of the population, they are viewed by the military as a threat to the
identity of the nation, which they were chosen to protect. One final observation of the 1960 coup
is that the civilian government was restored with an increased power and influence of the
military on the democratic regime.
Military Coup of 1971
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Following the rule of the Democratic Party, the Justice Party was elected in 1961. The
party successfully instituted a level of stability to the country towards the end of the 1960s.
However, by the early 1970s, tensions between right and left wing groups and the resulting
political polarization led to domestic turmoil. Turkey experienced an economic recession at the
end of that year, which precipitated a great deal of civil unrest with demonstrations, labor strikes
as well as political assassinations. Political turmoil and violence within the country was blamed
on the leadership of Suleyman Demirel. The level of violence and fractionalization within the
country influenced the military to believe that there was no alternative but to remove the current
government from power.
In contrast to the first coup, the 1971 coup was the result of a memorandum sent to Prime
Minister Demirel by the Chief of General Staff, Memduh Ta!maç. This memorandum served as
an ultimatum of the armed forces. While not explicitly demanding Demirel’s resignation, the
memorandum expressed a demand for the “formation, within the context of democratic
principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current anarchical
situation and which, inspired by Atatürk’s views, will implement the reformist laws envisaged by
the constitution,”114 the memorandum also made clear that if the demands were not met, the
army would exercise its “constitutional duty” in order to take power.115 When Demirel and his
cabinet fled leadership, the memorandum resulted in the establishment of a two-year technocratic
government. The technocratic government ruled Turkey from 1971 to 1973 under the scrutiny of
the military.
During this time, greater constitutional reforms were implemented by the military
through a 1971 memorandum and the role of the MGK was further extended in an amendment
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approved in 1973. The military’s amendments in 1971 replaced the word “representatives” with
“commanders,” which indicated that the five commanders of the army would automatically
become members of the MGK. In addition, “the MGK’s powers were further strengthened by
replacing the expression “recommends with “submits” and dropping the words “to assist.” From
then on, the MGK “submitted” its principles to the Council of Ministers concerning national
security and enduring coordination.”116
After reviewing the 1971 coup, it is clear that it has many parallels to the coup that
preceded it. As in 1960, the coup was preceded by a period of economic and sociopolitical
unrest, which resulted in popular protests among Turkish citizens. In addition, parallel to the
previous coup, when civilian power was again re-instated, the military succeeded in
implementing constitutional reforms, which expanded their level of control within government.
Finally, although lasting longer than the previous coup, returned the power to a civilian
government within a short time frame. Unlike the previous coup of 1971, the Turkish military
did not feel that their identity was threatened through reforms, allowing for slightly more
tolerance of Islamic freedoms.
Military Coup of 1980
Following the return to civilian rule in 1973, Turkey was ruled by several short-lived,
unstable and internally divided coalition governments. Each coalition government experienced
extreme fragmentation and governmental gridlock due to severe polarization between the right
and left in all sectors of society. During this period, Turkey also experienced increased political
violence between religious and ethnic groups, radical leftists and ultra-nationalist militant
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groups.117 In addition, as in the previous two periods of Turkish history, this period also marked
extreme economic struggle for the country. Unemployment was high and the economy was
experiencing hyperinflation, which left all citizens struggling.
These conditions precipitated Turkey’s third military intervention in 1980, which sought
to bring both peace and stability to the country. The military resumed all executive and
legislative positions for the next 38 months. During this time it replaced the 1961 constitution
with the 1982 constitution. New reforms put limits on individual rights and orchestrated the
election of the 1980s coup leader, Kenan Evran.118 It is during Evran’s presidency that the
military was granted power at the highest levels of decision-making.119 In order to try to prevent
a return to chaos and violence, a series of very undemocratic laws were passed and the MGK’s
power was further increased. The 1982 Constitution established State Security Courts, which
allowed military judges to try civilians for crimes “against the territorial integrity of the country,
the free democratic order, or against the Republic, together with offenses directly involving the
internal and external security of the state.”120 The comingling of the military and the country’s
judiciary system marks one of the most undemocratic tenants of military’s role in the political
system.
The coup of 1980 preceded the greatest number of changes to the civilian constitution
that had ever been made by the military. While previous coups introduced constitutional reforms,
“the 1982 Constitution was designed to correct what the military saw to be a costly weakness of
the 1961 Constitution, namely, the guarantee of unprecedented individual and group rights and
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liberties in the absence of properly drawn limits.”121 This new constitution put many limits on
basic rights and liberties, which could now be curtailed by law in order to protect national or
public concerns. This more restrictive constitution was seen as a necessary move to protect the
country from “excessive political violence and polarization and it increased the role of the
military in politics dramatically.”122
Another important change that the military made in order to expand its breadth of power
was to change the definition of national security. “Article 2 of the 1983 Law of the MGK defined
the concept of national security very broadly. It included the protection of constitutional order of
the state, its national existence, integrity of all political, social, cultural and economic interests of
the state in the international field.”123 This purposefully vague definition gave the military broad
powers which enabled it to control a great deal of public life, including but not limited to: the
ability to regulate TV stations and broadcasting hours, suggesting the timing of elections,
determining school curriculum, place embargos upon “Islamic capital,” make bureaucratic
appointments and finally, to abolish penal immunities of members of parliament at its
discretion.124
In preparation for the next set of elections, the military banned all former political parties
and politicians from running in order to precipitate “a more peaceful return to democracy.” A
peaceful transition was not all the military had in mind with this stipulation; banning all former
political parties was also an attempt to prevent Erbakan’s Islamic Welfare Party (RP) from
having a presence in Turkish politics, therefore preserving the secular nature of the Republic.
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Conclusion
Given the widely increased powers of the military establishment through constitutional
reforms implemented with every coup, one could easily make the argument that the absence of a
coup d’état following this period is unsurprising. The 1982 constitution allowed the military so
many legal means of determining the outcome of civilian politics that it would be entirely
unnecessary for them to directly intervene. Fortunately, despite the increasing role of the Turkish
military in politics through these military coups, the military did not interfere with the country’s
political elections, allowing the population to maintain their sense of control over which political
leaders they wanted to represent them. A continued respect for democratic elections is evidenced
through the outcome of the elections following each military coup. “Once the coups were over,
the electorate did not vote for the political cadres recommended by the military, as can be seen in
AP’s and ANAP’s and AKP’s victories in the aftermath of 1960, 1980 and 1997 interventions
respectively.”125 This would appear to indicate that the Turkish population was not afraid to vote
with its opinion, even if it was against the military.
These three military coups represent the close relationship between the military and
politics. I note three important aspects of these coups, which are unique to the Turkish
experience and allow for the categorization of Turkish military character. First, and most
importantly, during all three military coups the experience of direct Turkish military rule was
brief. The military only stood in a position of power until a new civilian government could be
instituted for the people. The short-lived nature of the coup d’états is a significantly unique piece
of evidence, which is not evident in the history of military coups around the world. For example,
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in Latin America many countries experienced coup d’états of democratically elected
governments, however these coups preceded long periods of direct military rule.
Second, each coup d’état in Turkey was preceded by intense periods of political and
economic instability.126 Therefore it would appear that the military was acting in an attempt to
fill a void of structure that was lacking at the time of the coups. The military was therefore
responding to societal conflicts, not simply seeking an acquisition of political power. Finally, it
is important to note that the coups carried out by the Turkish military garnered public support
due to the nature of widespread fractionalization in the government, and economic hardship at
the time that each coup took place. Therefore, we can attribute these military coups, as acts on
behalf of the public will. These three aspects of Turkish military intervention have led scholars
like Amos Perlmutter to classify the Turkish army as an “arbitrator army” which accepts the
general parameters of the existing social order, and is willing to return to the barracks when the
disputes are settled. Therefore it would seem that the Turkish Armed Forces do not seek to
maximize military rule, but instead are interested in increasing their own level of
professionalism.127
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Post 1980 to 2000 Turkey and the “Soft Coup”
The period between 1980 and 2000 saw an increased expansion in civilian control over
the military establishment and a decrease in direct military influence. An example of the
military’s final influential intervention in politics is noted by the post-modern coup of 1997 and
demonstrated a continued ability of the military to influence political outcomes. However, while
the military was able to successfully remove the Islamist Welfare Party through this indirect
coup, several important implications have resulted, which have effected the military’s ability to
influence political decision in the future. In addition, it is important to understand the details
behind the removal of the Islamic Welfare Party in order to understand the ability of the AKP to
come to power in 2002.
Turgut Özal was elected as the new Prime Minister following the coup of 1980 and after
nine years he was elected as president by the Parliament in 1989. Özal’s election marked the first
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time that a civilian had held the position since the military’s first coup d’état in 1960. Previously,
the military had maintained relative control over the presidency. “Since 1961, all the occupants
of the presidency had been retired senior commanders, and the tradition had grown up that the
president should be a neutral, non-partisan figure.”128 Özal’s leadership is therefore recognized
as making it possible for increasing the civilian influence in politics and fundamentally altered
the balance of power between the president and the prime minister.129
Özal’s term is remembered as a period in Turkish history that was characterized by the
separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)’s involvement in armed struggle. During his term, Özal
“challenged the Turkish Armed Forces over the issues such as military promotions, the Kurdish
separatist movement and the rise of political Islam.”130 With respect to the Kurdish population,
Özal legalized the use of the Kurdish language in addition to attempting to grant the Kurdish
population various cultural rights. “Özal’s role as founder of the ruling party and his experience
as premier – advantages that no president since [Mahmut] Bayar had possessed – allowed him to
control both the cabinet and the party from behind the scenes, without breaking the letter of the
constitution.”131 Having the ability to simultaneously influence the cabinet and the party allowed
for the transition to an active and dominating role of the presidency, which gave reason for the
military to gradually back away from involvement in the day to day administration of the
government.”132 According to William Hale, this served to begin a shift toward a new balance
where the generals would become subservient to the elected government like in other Western
democracies.133 “Thanks to Özal’s careful attitude, the military was able to hand over power to
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him without fear that he would immediately try to undo everything which they had achieved
between 1980 and 1983.”134 However, while Özal was able to considerably increase the level of
civilian influence over the military during this time, the military influence in politics increased
largely during the 1990s in response to the rise of PKK separatist terror and weak coalition
governments.135
Turkish politics in the 1980’s represented a great many strides in relation to the divide
between the secular and Islamic factions of society, opening the door to a more liberal idea of
secularism. “The military regime of 1980-3 had itself adopted an ambiguous position on the
secularist issue… the military continued to regard itself as the guardian of Kemalism; on the
other hand, it had approved the insertion of a clause in the constitution providing that ‘education
and instruction in religion and ethics’ should be a compulsory part of the curriculum in all
primary and secondary schools.”136 In addition, during this time, some official support was given
to the principle of the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” – that Islam was a part of Turkish national
culture and could therefore be incorporated into an all-embracing nationalist doctrine.137
Özal’s liberal economic policies helped to support a rising middle class; at the same time
there was increased migration from Turkey’s rural areas to the larger cities. The social reforms of
this time can be seen as a result of the growing rural population in urban cities and the
accommodation of their values.138 The changes implemented during this time demonstrate the
evolution of governmental policies with the evolution of the society, which the government
operated in. Reflecting the desires of the people, all of the changes that arose during Özal’s time
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in office proved that “armies change over time, and that they are not monolithic units – they are
segmented according to their own hierarchical structures, and may reflect divisions within the
societies within which they operate.”139 This evidence also seems to indicate the military’s
willingness to accept policy changes that reflect the values of the society.
In June of 1993, 1,150 delegates of the True Path Party (the DYP) were working to elect
a successor for Suleyman Demirel, the leader who had dominated the conservative right for the
past 30 years.140 It was with Özal’s death 17 April 1993 that Demirel was finally given a window
of opportunity to fulfill his dream of becoming head of state. It was not long before Demirel left
the party without looking back. The period after Özal’s death held much anticipation within the
Turkish population and even more excitement was created by the surprise candidacy of Tansu
Çiller, who “had only joined the True Path Party shortly before the 1991 elections when Demirel
had brought her in to brighten up his party’s dusty and conservative image.”141 Soon after, the
DYP went on to win the elections, making Demirel the prime minister of Turkey for the sixth
time with a coalition government that included the Social Democrat People’s Party headed by
Erdal Inönü. Despite beginning on an exciting note, unfortunately Demirel’s leadership marked
the beginning of a decade of dysfunctional coalition governments.142 The 1990s would later
become known as “a lost decade” in Turkish history that was characterized by hyperinflation,
military meddling, impotent governance, mafia scandals and human rights abuses.143
When Çiller placed her name forward for the True Path Party leadership no one thought
that she could seriously win. However, uncalculated by many was Çiller’s large support base in
139

William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (New York: Routledge, 1994), 299
Hugh and Nicole Pope, “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” (Woodstock: The Overlook Press,
2000), 298.
141
Hugh and Nicole Pope, “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” (Woodstock: The Overlook Press,
2000), 298.
142
Ibid, 299.
143
Ibid.
140

61

the deep regions of Anatolia, the regions thought to be most conservative and reactionary.144 In
fact, Çiller gained so many votes in the first round that she forced the other two contenders out of
the running altogether.
Çiller ruled Turkey as the first women prime minister from 1993 to 1996. Çiller’s
appearance on the political stage was most likely credited to the feminist movement, which
emerged after the 1980 military coup. “Women had largely been less affected by the army’s
silencing of civil society, largely because their cause was not deemed worthy of much official
attention”145 in comparison to the difficulties the country was experiencing with the Kurdish
separatist movements. Çiller’s election raised the hopes of many Turks of modernization due to
her “promises of reform and her Westernized outlook;”146unfortunately, she would prove a
disappointment for many when she ultimately abandoned her most progressive ideas due to
strong opposition from within her own party and lack of her own personal power base.147
In the end she “sought the army’s protection and support, in exchange for which she gave
the security forces a free hand in attacking the Kurdish insurgency.”148 This tells us that this
particular period in Turkish history was still heavily influenced by the military despite all of the
ground that Özal seemed to make during his leadership. Prime Minister Çiller’s term signaled a
return of the military’s influence. The military was again given greater amounts of autonomy
with the parliament, having the authority to approve all decisions taken by the now militarydominated National Security Council.
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Turkish disappointment in Çiller’s leadership became apparent in the 1995 elections
where her party only won 10 percent of the vote – third to Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party
and the Motherland Party ruled by Mesut Yilmaz. While the polls indicated a win by the Islamic
Welfare Party of Erbakan, the military and the vast secular population was not willing to accept
the leadership of an Islamic party. “After long negotiations, the two rival conservative parties
were forced into a power-sharing deal that neither wanted. Mesut Yilmaz was to be prime
minister until the end of the year and Çiller was to take over for the two years after that.”149
Çiller’s agreement to form a coalition government with the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) after the
1995 elections gave the military concern. This party was least preferred by the military with
respect to its religious undertones.
Necmettin Erbakan entered office under the coalition in July 1996, and it was not long
before his policies started to make the military nervous. For instance, early on in his rule, he
“announced a plan to build a large mosque on Taksim Square, the secular heart of modern
Istanbul.”150 It was clear that Erbakan made the most of his new influence and he regularly
invited the religious orders to dine at the prime minister’s residence. In addition, he organized
trips to Libya and Iran in order to seek “rapprochement with Muslim states.”151 Erbakan’s “use
of prime ministerial powers to appoint Islamist allies into the bureaucracy, [support an] increase
in the number of religious schools and an accumulation of funds by Islamist holding
companies”152 placed the military under high alert.
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Due to concerns in the military establishment about the increasing Islamic presence in the
Turkish government that was perceived to endanger the identity of the nation, a more open
opposition to the current government could be noted. Members of the military who have been
dubbed by various scholars as “absolutists,” including the commander Çevık Bir, started to unite
like-minded individuals in the media, business chambers, unions, higher education and
politicians in order to block the government from exercising its power.153 In order to further this
goal, the military coordinated and encouraged societal reaction within the country against
Erbakan’s Islamist Welfare Party. Many public protests could be observed throughout Turkey
during this time.
Finally, in response to Erbakan’s increasingly Islamic sentiments, the military decided to
act during a National Security Council meeting with the military in February 1997. During this
meeting the military gave the government an ultimatum in the form of 18 recommendations,
which would correct its “anti-secular” policies.154 These measures included the closure of
religious schools, a new law allowing for the dismissal of civil servants who were accused of
Islamic ties and tighter control of the country’s Islamic ‘foundations.’155 Erbakan did sign this
document, however, he took no action toward implementing the plans. He was soon to find out
that if “prime ministers ignore the ‘recommendations’ of the National Security Council at their
own peril.”156 This incident in Turkish history has later become known as the military’s ‘soft
coup’ because while the military did not perform a direct military coup, there ‘indirect’ pressure
was enough to scare the party out of office. Erbakan stepped down in June in a last-ditch effort to
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save the government through Çiller’s move into Erbakan’s position in order to bring Turkey to
early elections.157 Instead a coalition government was formed between Motherland Party Leader
Yilmas and Bulent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party, which was helped by the Republican
People’s Party.158
While the military was ultimately successful in removing the Welfare Party from power
in 1997, two unintended effects strongly impacted the military’s capacity to influence politics n
the long run. First, the military’s popularity markedly decreased after 1997. Therefore it would
appear that the affair led to an eventual civilian mistrust of the military establishment. According
to an opinion poll that was conducted in January 2010 at Bilgi University in Istanbul showed that
trust for the military had fallen to 73 percent.159 Secondly, it became clear that the military was
no longer a homogenous organization that worked together as a whole as they did in previous
coups. Scholars have noted that an “excessive presence” of the TAF’s number two general in the
Office of General Staff, Çevik Bir, highlighted that the army was being pushed toward this
response by a strong faction within the ranks of the TAF, but that it was not a cohesive
movement among all members or generals. This divided institution has remained in the country
to the present day.
While the military hoped that banning the Welfare Party would extinguish the politically
powerful Islamist elements, junior members from the RPP went on to form the Justice and
Development Party, (AKP) only five years later. Çiller resigned at the same time due to
corruption allegations and Bulent Ecevit moved to replace her as Prime Minister in 1998. A
coalition government that included the Democratic Left Party, the National action Party and the
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ANAP governed the country from 1999 to the 2002 general elections. Suleyman Demirel
returned as the president of Turkey until 2000, when the position is handed to Ahmet Necdet
Sezer.160
Despite the many failures of Çiller’s campaign promises, she did fight to get a Customs
Union Agreement for the country with the EU, which went into force in January 1996.161 Her
hard work did eventually prove to be a success when Turkey was given candidacy status by the
EU at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 after a long wait for consideration to their application. This
marked a period of a multitude of constitutional reforms in order to prepare the country for EU
membership. In order to align the government with EU norms, an important part of these
constitutional changes became aimed at decreasing the military’s political role. The period
between 1980 and 2000 was a period full of weak coalition governments and a fragile economy,
which pre-empted an increasing involvement of the military in political decisions. Only toward
the end of this period was progress made in order to implement reforms that would control the
power of the military establishment. Furthermore, the period exhibited the first time that an
Islamic government was able to hold power within the government, allowing the opportunity to
see the beginning of the Islamic political movement within Turkey and the response of the
military.
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Emergence and Longevity of the AKP
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) represents the only majority Islamic party to
have retained power in the Turkish government. Furthermore, the party has not only been able to
retain power, but has continued to win the majority of the vote in three consecutive democratic
elections. This success is particularly interesting considering the fate of other Islamic parties,
which came before them, who were quickly expunged from power. In order to understand the
military’s lack of intervention during the AK Party Era, it is important to understand the nature
of the AKP.
Only five years after Turkey’s first ruling “Islamic government was forced to step down
through military pressure, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 34% of the vote in
November 2002.”162 The party has held an unprecedented single-party rule by popular vote in
three general elections since 2002 and remains a very strong political power. Furthermore, the
portion of the vote that the AKP has claimed has only increased over the years. In 2007, the AKP
162

Hugh and Nicole Pope, “Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey,” (Woodstock: The Overlook Press,
2000), 322.

67

held 47.6 percent of the vote and then 49.8 percent in 2011. Until the Gezi Park Protests in June
2013, it seemed that nothing would stand in the way of the AK Party’s re-election in 2014.
However, an increase of fractionalization within the Islamic sector of Turkish politics in recent
years has caused many scholars to speculate about the ability of the party to retain power.
Nevertheless, despite these concerns, the party was able to again gain majority support in
municipal elections that took place March 30, 2014. The results of the election have allowed the
AKP to maintain control in Istanbul and Ankara, with a total of 45 percent of the vote AKP. This
representation marks an increase from 39 percent support in the 2009 municipal elections.163
As mentioned before, the AKP’s political success is especially remarkable when
reflecting back on the first emergence of Islamic political parties in Turkey. Given this history,
how has the Islamic movement survived? After his removal from office, Erbakan’s Welfare
Party was dissolved in 1998 by a Constitutional Court on the ground that it had anti-secular
policies. This led many of its members to move to support its successor party, the Virtue Party.
However, it was not long before the military found reason to rid the Virtue Party of its political
rights. When the party was officially closed down in 2001, two of today’s most popular AKP
leaders, Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdo!an led a reformist faction called the Justice and
Development Party (AKP).164 Scholars maintain that “popular discontent with coalition rule,
stemming from a 1999-2001 economic and financial crisis, and perceptions of government
corruption and ineffectiveness opened the way for the AKP to achieve single-party rule with its
first electoral victory in 2002.”165 Embracing many of the country’s different political groups,
which included the “Islamists, Turkish nationalists, Kurds, rural conservatives, Muslim-sect
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members and globalized liberals,”166 the AKP was able to gain the support of a wide range of the
population. More importantly, the “AKP represented a newly-urbanized majority who had
descended from villagers and small-town merchants.”167 This history would explain the AKP’s
continued ability to command the political support of the rural regions of the country.
Since the AKP’s election in 2002, the government and the military have maintained a
delicate relationship with one another. In an attempt to try to prevent military action, the AKP
has sought consensus with the military by avoiding Islamic policies, and identifying as
conservative rather than Islamist. However, this did not stop the military from speaking out
against AK Party policies, and their relationship has remained complicated due to continued
divisions within the military establishment. In May 2003, Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök
described the military relationship with the AKP as “harmonious” while later making a public
statement that warned of the existing threat of regressive Islam, and assuring the public of the
military’s diligence to monitor these threats closely.168 During private meetings with military
commanders during this time, the general also stated that as long as the AK Party did not violate
secularism, the military would not move against it.169 These conflicting statements would seem
to indicate that at this time there were still members of the military who held traditions outlooks
on Islam, forcing the general to cater to both sides.
Despite recent challenges, the AKP has successfully expanded the separation of civilian
politics from military influence. As Pope states, “since the AKP has come to power, the military
has reportedly become less scrutinizing of its rising officers’ religious backgrounds and views,
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taxes and regulations on the consumption of alcohol have increased, and the wearing of
headscarves by women in universities and other public places has gained legal and social
acceptance.”170 These measures demonstrate a great change from the previously rigorous
standard of secularization and how the AKP has ushered in an acceptance for a plurality of
beliefs and acceptance of various social lifestyles.
When the party was elected, “Erdo!an [said that] he now wanted to be known simply as
conservative, and explicitly stated that he had broken with his radical Islamic past.”171 Erdo!an
and the representatives of the AKP worked hard to redefine their image and to remove
themselves from relation to Islam. Reconstructing this image largely came from political
speeches and media posturing. One example is when Erdo!an emphasized the disconnect
between an individual’s faith and the proper way to rule a country, “Islam is a religion,
democracy is a way of ruling. You can’t compare the two.”172 The disassociation with Islam was
meant to assure the military that the party was not a threat to Turkey’s secular roots. Instead, the
party focused on “supporting the quest to join the EU and by disassociating itself from Islamist
policies.”173 However, despite the party’s efforts to control its image, the military has continued
to be suspicious about the possibility of a hidden Islamic agenda within the party.174 The inherent
struggle between secular nationalism and Islamism has been a struggle since the founding of
Turkey and continues to be a struggle in today.
Recep Tayyip Erdo!an, then the chairman of the Justice and Development Party was not
able to obtain the role of prime minister by the most conventional means at first. Erdo!an, the
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former mayor of Istanbul and his strong Islamic roots had been barred from politics because of
what was perceived as an “Islamic provocation during a December 1997 political rally”175 where
he recited a poem with provocative Islamic undertones. Therefore, his close associate Abdullah
Gül was the first prime minister of the AKP. Despite being banned from political office when the
party won, Erdo!an wasted no time asserting himself as a powerful force within the country.
Shortly after the party won the election and “without waiting to overcome his personal legal bar
to office, [Erdo!an] set off on a whirlwind tour of European capitals. His aim was to convince
Turkey’s European allies to give Ankara a firm date for the start of accession talks at the EU
summit in Copenhagen in December 2002.”176 When he was abroad, “Erdo!an was warmly
received as Turkey’s new and undisputed leader by his European counterparts who were
impressed by his direct approach and relieved by his reformist program.”177 Unfortunately,
despite his overwhelming popularity, his efforts did not result in a date for accession talks. In
December of 2002, constitutional changes were made in order to allow Erdo!an to run for
parliament. Once he won a seat in parliament in March, Gül quickly resigned from the position
of prime minister to become president, leaving Erdo!an to fulfill the role of prime minister.178
Turkey’s historical ties to Atatürk have led to a continued debate and divergence on how
Islam should play a role in Turkish society. Despite all of Atatürk’s Western and modern
reforms, it is no secret that Islam has remained an important drive within the Turkish culture
since Ottoman times; “Islam’s place in society is the most controversial issue to divide the
Turkish Republic since it was founded in 1923, sometimes deeper even than the ethnic Kurdish
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question.”179 This extremely contentious issue in the Turkish narrative is closely tied to the role
of the military in Turkish civilian politics and therefore makes it’s understanding crucial to one’s
ability to determine how the role of the military has changed over the years.
The debate about Islam’s role in politics is extremely controversial due to the fact that the
entire birth and survival of the Turkish Republic was based upon the need to sever old Islamic
ties. Since the multitude of reforms enacted by Atatürk at the beginning of the Turkish Republic,
“the Kemalist establishment would say that until Erbakan came to power, religion had been kept
firmly excluded from affairs of state thanks to Republican reforms.”180 At the same time, the
Turkish government has been paying the salaries of 80,000 imams each month as well as
dictating the content of their weekly sermons since the founding of the Republic in 1923,181
policies which would not exist in other secular countries like the United States or France. Thus,
“despite half a century of attempts to put religion under state control, the role of Islam in Turkish
society and politics remains influential.”182 The persistence of Islam since the formation of the
Republic seems to indicate the inevitability of an Islamic based party in Turkey.
Despite their ambitious policy aims for their new-found leadership, the AKP’s policies
during its first term in office were cautious. In order not to avoid creating waves, the AKP
initially held off on a lot of great changes that the party campaigned for before their election. For
example, the party did not move forward to legalize the Islamic headscarf in schools and to boost
religious education; they also delayed a compromise with Cyprus.183 In addition, the AKP did
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not touch several issues such as the military relationship and the Kurdish question in its first
leadership term despite those issues’ prominence in the party’s platform because “the AKP
leadership lacked both clout and, more important, the political will to overcome the traditional
civilian posture of compromise with the military that has been, to this point, a permanent feature
of Turkish politics.”184 It would not be until the party’s second and third terms that significant
changes were introduced to the Turkish political system.
The AKP was thus playing it safe and testing their political freedoms carefully with the
military in order to maintain the party’s power. Erdo!an and Gül knew all too well that pushing
the military too fast and too soon could only result in a similar fate to that of Erbakan and his
party’s rule. What the AKP did do, however, was move full-speed ahead on EU accession
negotiations, which began to gain momentum in March 2001 when “the Turkish government
formally unveiled its first National Program to start adapting to the EU body of laws.”185 If
realized, the National Program’s goals for policy change would amount to the greatest and most
comprehensive transformation that Turkey had undergone since it’s founding in 1923.186 It is the
reforms of the National Program that helped the Turkish democracy to consolidate the power of
the military. Many scholars hypothesize that the AKP’s strong connection with the EU was
related to the desire to defend its position of power from the military in one of the only ways it
could do so without causing alarm to the military.
While the army knew that the advancement of EU accession agreements would serve to
leave them with less influence in the political system, they had little choice but to comply with
the negotiations because to go against the West would have meant going against the basic
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aspirations of the Turkish Republic since it was founded by Atatürk.187 When it came down to it,
“the military was not against EU membership as long as it did not have to make a concession
from the principles of secularity and territorial integrity.”188 By carefully changing the wording
of existing laws, the AKP effectively changed the definitions of secularity and territorial integrity
in order to expand democracy within the Turkish constitution. While the EU membership did not
absolutely require the military to give up its principles of secularity of territorial integrity, the
AKP would effectively change the definitions of secularity and territorial integrity in order to
bring about a more democratic balance during its re-drafting of the constitution by carefully
changing the wording of existing laws and taking control over what constituted a “national threat
to security.”
Among the army’s concessions during this time was their agreement “to take military
judges off the three-man bench of state security courts.”189 This represented a great improvement
for the Turkish judicial system, whose democratic nature was undermined by allowing members
of the armed forced to try civilians. Furthermore, “in July 2002 it allowed the reduction of
compulsory military service from fifteen to eighteen months.”190 Finally, “Parliament scrapped
the infamous Article 8 of the anti-terrorism law, which punished intellectuals for speaking out in
favor of Kurds, but courts went on using other regulations to the same effect.”191 These laws all
stemmed from the Turkish military’s right to protect the country against external threats – which
they labeled as the PKK and the Islamic resurgence in the region and were written into the 1982
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Constitution, following the military’s last coup. “The army differed with the AKP on how far to
go in granting rights to Kurds, solving the Cyprus problem, and, of course, diluting its own
powers enshrined in law by the generals after the 1980 coup. But it could hardly go against the
West, and vowed that it was in favor of EU membership as a ‘geopolitical and geostrategic
obligation.’”192 Therefore, it would appear that the possibility of achieving accession to the
European Union helped the AK Party implement various constitutional reforms, which may
otherwise have been blocked by the military in an attempt to keep their power.
Several further packages of EU reforms passed under AKP in rule 2003-4, which
“expanded Kurdish cultural rights, [brought] some transparency to the army budget and
[restricted] the executive power of the National Security Council.”193 One of the most critical
was “the legislative package of July 2003, which, as a part of Turkey’s commitment to align its
civil-military relations with the EU’s ‘good practices,’ aimed to tip the civil-military balance in
favor of civilians by repealing the executive powers of the National Security Council (MGK) that
overlapped or sometimes exceeded executive branch authority and by reducing its status to that
of an advisory party.”194 Previous to this constitutional reform, the government would implement
all policy recommendations provided by the MGK without civilian oversight.
These many reforms are what finally got Turkey a date for accession negotiations in
October 2005. However, despite all of the positive progress that was made in the consolidation
of Turkish democracy during this period, by “the end of the AKP’s second term in office, the
process had come to a virtual standstill.”195 Today, “there is a deep ambivalence in Turkey
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towards the EU. Polls typically show a roughly 60 percent majority of Turks support
membership, but only 40 percent believe that it will actually happen.”196 This change in popular
opinion is a direct result of the EU’s continuation to delay actual progress on the country’s
accession into the union. “President Abdulah Gül has repeatedly said that Turkey might prefer
the Norwegian option, able to join but choosing not to do so.”197 This attitude is arguably the
result of years of delay on behalf of the European Union, but could also be because of other
reasons. While the EU allowed the AK Party to successfully push numerous constitutional
reforms, it may be that the Party was really only looking to achieve these ends, but has little
incentive to actually join the EU.
The lack of interest in the EU has been hypothesized to have relation to the simple fact
that the “AKP [has] felt less and less need for EU support in its struggle against the once allpowerful Turkish Armed Forces.”198 As time has gone on, the widespread public popularity of
the AKP has created enough of a protection form the wrath of the military as accession to the EU
would have provided. While the Turkish military has always been wary of pro-Islamic
governments, they would never go against popular public opinion by forcing them out of office,
because they recognize that their popularity depends greatly on the Turkish people.
The AKP started to feel the pressure from the Turkish military when it entered into the
general elections of 2007, “as it became clear that the AKP was intending to nominate Abdullah
Gül to become president in early 2007 – thus making his wife Hayrunnisa Turkey’s first First
Lady to wear a headscarf – the chief of general staff began dropping critical hints. A group
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including retired officers started organizing pro-secularist demonstrations.”199 Despite the
similarities between the AKP and Erbakan’s Welfare Party in 1997, the AKP held their ground
and responded by stating that the Chief of General Staff was constitutionally answerable to the
Prime Minister.200 Although the party was under threat like Erbakan’s party was before, the AKP
refused to lose its nerve and stood its ground. In order to prevent the military’s plan for a
potential coup, elections were brought forward from November to July. When faced with a
choice between AKP and the military, on 22 July 2007 the population voted with outstanding
approval of the AKP, giving the ruling party 46.7 percent of the vote.201 The party’s ability to
increase “its share of votes from 47 to 49.9 percent in the 2007 and 2011 general elections
respectively,”202 understandably worried the military. Their victory left no question about the
public’s preference and forced the military ‘back into their barracks.’ This e-memorandum was a
moment for significant change in Turkish civil-military relations and clearly subordinated the
military to civilian orders. Despite their concerns, the military would not be able to get rid of the
AKP due to their overwhelming public support.
With the AKP’s strong following in the second general election, the period between 2007
and 2011 marked a continued decline in the military’s ability to dictate both domestic and
foreign policies. “When the AKP was fully in charge, in 2009, prosecutors discovered what they
said was a web of coup conspiracies organized by a deep-state group called Ergenekon.”203 The
coup plot was said to originate within ‘deep-state’ forces of the Turkish establishment, which are
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protectors of the secular establishment. It was these actors that felt the need to act against the
AKP government in relation to the inevitable election of Abdulluh Gül, Erdogan’s close
associate, as the next president of the country. Ergenekon had highlighted “the depth of the
animosity against the AKP government in the secular establishment and its determination to use
extralegal means against it if necessary.”204 The catalyst of this secular backlash was later
attributed to the AKP’s repeal of a law that banned women from wearing a headscarf in places
that offer public services.205
Clearly unintended by the military, the revelations of the Ergenekon coup plot have
“acted as catalysts enabling the AKP government, in a spectacular act of defiance, to pass a law
in June 2009 clearing the way for the first time in the Republic’s history for providing civilian
courts to try military personnel in peacetime for crimes subject to the Code of Criminal
Procedure.”206 These crimes include organized crime, crime that affects national security and
coups d’état; therefore, the move effectively ends the judicial immunity that the military has
enjoyed since its establishment in 1923. Ironically, the coup plot “has created an unprecedented
opportunity for the government to repair and reset, more intentionally and intensely than in the
past, the lopsided balance between civil and military authorities in favor of constitutionally
elected organs.”207 The unilateral power and influence of the military has been greatly weakened
throughout the recent Ergenekon trials causing the military to lose “valuable legitimacy in the
eyes of the public, and thus the core of its influence.”208 While the military has intervened in
politics throughout the country’s history, it has never done so without public support, therefore,
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if the military no longer possesses the support of the population, it would no longer be able to
justify its interventions and diminish their ability to influence the political scene.
The AKP further asserted its civilian political power by introducing a Constitutional
Referendum in 2010, which was “designed to reshape the structure of higher administrative
courts and reduce the role of the military in Turkish politics.”209 The referendum went to a vote
in September and passed with 58 percent support, showing that Erdo!an and the AKP largely
had the confidence of the country.210 The passing of this referendum shows the populations’
desire to further modernize the country in line with accession requirements to the European
Union211 as well as the readiness to move away from the long-standing acceptance of an
overarching military authority. “The referendum was seen by Erdo!an as a path for ending the
government’s inability to define the fundamental parameters of politics resulting from its being
blocked by the establishment’s old guards.”212 In addition to these important changes to the
balance between the military and civilian role in politics, “legislators rewrote one-third of the
Turkish constitution, adopted international human rights laws, ended capital punishment,
expanded women’s rights, discouraged torture with new measures and saw to an improvement of
prison conditions. New laws curtailed restrictions on freedom of expression, civil society and the
media, as well as the Turkish military’s long-standing dominance of politics.
By 2010, time had caught up to the Turkish military leadership, “during the Supreme
Military Council (YAS) meeting in August 2010, arrest warrants were issued for eleven senior
officers up for promotion who were allegedly involved in the ongoing investigation into the so-
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called Sledgehammer coup plot.”213 The referendum allowed the government to target one of the
army’s non-institutional elements of influence in Turkish politics, their ability to completely
control their own appointments. While the prime minister signed off on these appointments, the
prime minister had never before challenged their decisions on these matters. The referendum
thus allowed the government to end “the practice of the TAF high command, imposing its own
list of promotions and retirements by vetoing the appointment of the land forces commander
because of his alleged involvement in Sledgehammer.”214 Later that year, the AKP again
consolidated power over the military authority in “November 2010 with the government’s
suspension of three generals from their duties for suspected ties to an early coup plot.”215
Despite the great deal of progress that has come as a result of EU reforms, the Turkish
Armed Forces retain the ability to influence politics through “inflated definitions of national
security in many of the laws and regulations.”216 While there are many different ways that the
Turkish military has exerted its influence upon civilian policy, one of the most common has been
to use security threats as an excuse to exercise greater power within the country’s borders. By
inflating security risks to the current government in regards to internal issues like Kurdish
nationalism, the military has been able to exert influence on civilian policymakers. This
realization has precipitated the AKP’s efforts to “desecuritize” the military’s national security
concerns. Throughout history it has been very apparent that “the spread of armed conflict has
naturally led the military to extend its influence within state institutions – the security services,
the judiciary (through the establishment of special military-style courts), and, in particular, the
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MGK.217 The AKP sees the “de-securitization” of various internal security concerns to be the
first step to allow the military to further remove itself from the political sphere. Part of these
desecuritization efforts have included the AKP’s removal of “religious recationaryism” as one of
the military’s perceived threats; “by doing so the AKP attempted to desecuritize the issue of “the
rise of political Islam” in the eyes of the military.”218 Another critical element of this
desecuritization policy has the “Kurdish Question.” For many years, increased military influence
has coincided with increased PKK activity. Therefore, the AKP has placed an emphasis on
controlling the separatist Kurdish movements and the PKK through an extension of rights of the
Kurdish population within Turkey as well as by making an effort to improve its relations with
neighboring countries, which provide support to the PKK.219 “By resolving its security problems
with its neighbors (desecuritizing its problems), the government at the same time decreased the
military’s role in politics.”220
Turkey has come a very long way in re-determining the balance between civilian political
power and military power and influence in the political realm. This progress has been crucial to
the successful consolidation of Turkish democracy within the last decade. While the country
undoubtedly has room to further democratize, it is important to recognize how far the country
has come since its creation. Looking ahead, the most important step to achieve increased
democratic consolidation with the Turkish state, will be to neutralize the “threat to the territorial
integrity of the country.”221
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Hypothesis One
My first hypothesis has evaluated whether or not the country’s increase in constitutional
reforms can explain a lack of military intervention in politics. My first hypothesis states that:
when there is a strong constitutional separation between the military and the government, the
military will not intervene in politics. As was stated in the background of my case study, Turkey
has implemented a series of constitutional reforms since 1999, which were intended to expand
the degree of civilian control over the military. I will assess whether or not these reforms have
had an impact on Turkish civil-military relations by evaluating the language of the particular
reforms and their impact on the military power in addition to the actions of the military after
such reforms were passed.
Content of Constitutional Reforms
Since 1999, Turkey has implemented a total of two major constitutional reforms, which
were implemented within the country in 2001 and 2004; eight legislative packages, which have
been introduced between February 2002 and July 2004; and finally, the Constitutional
Referendum of 2010. All of these reforms were made in attempts to meet political conditions of
the Copenhagen criteria, which, if met could allow Turkey entrance into the European Union.
Before these reforms were imposed, the military has historically taken advantage of seven
different institutional means to impose their influence in politics. These included the National
Security Council (MGK); Bureaucratic Hierarchy; Control of the Promotion Process;
82

Departments, Groups and Centers under the General Staff; the Presidential Office; State Security
Courts; Defense Budget Autonomy; the Judiciary; and the Law on Turkish Armed Forces
Internal Service.
The momentum towards EU accession has served as one of the most influential drives to
change the nature of the Turkish political system, with the ultimate goal of democratic
consolidation. When reviewing Turkey’s application for EU membership, it has become clear
that one of the most prevalent concerns listed in all European Commission country progress
reports, has been the dominant role of the military in Turkish politics.222 European Commission
Regular Progress Reports that were published in 1998, 1999 and 2000 all criticized the role of
the National Security Council (MGK) as a means for the military to exert undue influence over
civilian politics. The Commission argued repeatedly that the recommendations were binding and
had a significant impact on government policies. The final common criticism of the military’s
role in politics was the impact of State Security Courts on the independence of the judiciary.
The first constitutional package of 2001 marked the first step to civilianize the country’s
civil-military relations by revising Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution. The amendment worked
to increase the number of civilian members in the MGK from five to eight so that they would
exceed the number of military officers within the body. Furthermore, the amendment effectively
limited the role of the body’s recommendations by requiring the Council of Ministers to
“evaluate decisions of the National Security Council…”223 In the 1982 Constitution,
recommendations by the MGK were essentially binding, requiring the Council of Ministers to
give “priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council…”224 While the
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wording of this law is not explicitly binding, in practice, it has historically meant that the Turkish
government will implement any decisions made or policies prescribed by the National Security
Council. Therefore, the 1982 constitution allowed the military to completely control which
military policies would be implemented in order to achieve national security.
In order to address criticisms on the role of the judiciary, the Turkish Grand National
Assembly adopted an amendment to the Law on State Security Courts, which effectively
replaced military judges with civilian judges on June 22, 1999. These courts were later abolished
altogether in 2004.225 These two amendments made it possible for all decisions made in the High
Military Council to be subject to judicial review, as well as to make it possible for military courts
to try officers only on crimes which were committed against other officers or related to military
service. All other crimes must be tried in civilian courts, effectively preventing military
immunity from the law.
While these reforms were very important for creating a separation between civil-military
relations, in 2001, the European Commission called for provisions to monitor the newly adopted
constitutional amendments, due to a continuation of inappropriate behavior by military officers.
The EC specifically highlighted a disapproval of the “behavior of senior military officers for
expressing their opinions on issues including emergency rule in the Southeast, the fight against
terrorism, the implementation of political and economic reforms for EU membership, and the
Cyprus question.”226 Furthermore, they still held issue with the “autonomous decision-making
power of the armed forces concerning the defense budget.”227 By keeping the authority to dictate
the defense budget to the military, the civilians lacked a final word on matters of national
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defense. With control of the defense budget, the military would be allowed to make very
important decisions about where to allocate funds and what would be purchased with the money
without needing to get any kind of approval by the civilian government.
Of the eight harmonization packages that were introduced as mechanisms to limit
military control in the government, two are especially notably. Enacted in July 2003, the seventh
harmonization package changed the function of the MGK in order to maintain that the body only
serves to advise the cabinet. Within this amendment, MGK meetings only take place once every
two months and the Secretary General of the council is to be selected by the prime minister and
approved by the president. This reform made it possible for civilians to be elected into the
position. Increasing the number of the civilians within the body has helped to place a check on
the military’s ability to control the agenda.228
The final harmonization amendment introduced in May 2004, served to create an increase
in the amount of civilian control over the defense budget was implemented.229 This amendment
has allowed for an increase in civilian supervision of defense expenditures through the expansion
of the role of the Court of Auditors. The Court of Auditors can oversee the military’s budget,
including items that were previously labeled confidential. In addition, the eighth harmonization
package removed military officials from all civilian board that they previously sat on such as the
Board of Inspection of Cinema and the Higher Education Board; positions previously held by the
military as an attempt to ensure threats to the republic (Islamism and Kurdish separatism) did not
leak into the education system or national broadcasts.230
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2010 Referendum
In 2010, the AKP government was able to further reforms on military power through a
referendum, which enjoyed 58 percent of support in September 2010.231
Continued progress on the consolidation of civilian control occurred when the
government took part in military promotions by insisting on delaying promotions of particular
officers in addition to vetoing a general who was expected to later become the new commander
of the army. This sort of assertion has only happened previously during Turgut Özal’s rule in
1987, therefore there is no way of telling whether or not this will become a trend for civilian
involvement in promotion in the future or if it was just a similar and isolated occurrence.232
Nonetheless, it asserts a level of civilian power, which had not previously existed in the Turkish
government. Within the 2010 referendum, the government also effectively annulled the
Temporary Article 15 from the constitution; the article previously allowed coup leaders to have
comprehensive immunity from persecution.233 Taking away a guarantee of immunity would
make it inherently more risky for the military to be associated with a coup plot against the
government.
By 2010, the European Commission was the first report which noted a sufficient progress
in terms of a decrease of senior military officers disclosing their opinions on various political
manners, stating that there was “a decrease in the number of incidents where the armed forces
exerted formal and informal influence on political issues beyond their remit.”234

231

“12 September 2010 Referendum Opinion Poll,” accessed March 14, 2014, Konda Research and Consultancy.
Yaprak Gürsoy, “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms on the Political Autonomy of the Turkish Military,” South
European Society and Politics 16 (2011): 299.
233
Müge Aknur, “Civil-Military Relations During the AK Party Era: Major Developments and Challenges,” Insight
Turkey 15 (2013), 141.
234
European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress Report, 11.
232

86

Finally, the government recently amended Article 35 of the Constitution. Article 35 – the
Internal Service Law – allowed the armed forces the right to intervene in the face of internal
threats. This constitutional change marks an especially important move for Turkey’s civilmilitary relationship because this article previously allowed military officers to legally carry out
coups against ruling governments.235
Evaluation of Constitutional Reforms
Turkey’s various constitutional reforms have allowed the civilian government to achieve
control over the military establishment. These reforms have removed the military’s institutional
powers by reducing the level of the MGK to an advisory body, increasing the number of civilian
members, which are a part of the MGK and reducing the number of meetings that the body can
have. In addition, its secretariat has been civilianized, the Secretary General no longer possesses
supervisory powers, the MGK’s access to civilian agencies has been removed and its budget has
been placed under control of the prime minister. In addition, reforms have removed military
members from the High Audio Visual Board and the Council of Higher Education, further
limiting their potential influence in civilian sectors of the government. The abolishment of the
State Security Courts, which previously allowed the military to try civilians in court, removed
military influence in the judiciary. The military’s autonomy over their finances was even
removed by placing financial decisions under the power of the Court of Audit and Parliament.236
With the advent of all of these reforms, the military’s institutional means of influencing politics
have been effectively removed.
For review, the table below lists each of the military’s institutional mechanisms of power
and the corresponding constitutional amendments:
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Institutional Mechanism of Power
MGK

Bureaucratic Hierarchy
Autonomy in Promotion Process
Departments, Groups and Centers developed
within the General Staff
Presidential Office
State Security Courts
Autonomy of Defense Budget
Law on TAF Internal Service
Advantage of the Judiciary

Constitutional Provisions
Increase number of civilians in the MGK;
decrease capacity of body to an advisory role
and decrease the number of meetings in 2003;
civilians to hold the position of Secretary
General.
Pending the new constitution, Chief of General
Staff will be responsible to the Prime Minister,
not the Minister of Defense.
Secretary General of MGK selected by the
Prime Minister and approved by the President
in 2003.
Military officials removed from all positions
on civilian’s boards, groups or centers in 2004.
Before the 1990s the majority of President’s
were retired military generals; retired generals
are not allowed to serve as Presidents.
Replacement of military judges with civilian
judges in 1999; Abolished courts in 2004.
Civilian oversight of the defense budget in
2004 through the Council of Auditors.
Amended in 2010 to prevent military officials
from having constitutional grounds for
carrying out coups against the government.
High Military Council subject to judicial
review in 2010; military courts role reduced to
cover only military crimes upon others in
military service; annulled Article 15 which
allowed immunity to military officials.

Actions of the military following the reforms
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Since Turkey has instituted the previously mentioned constitutional reforms the country has
not experienced another direct military intervention. Since the military began to institute
constitutional reforms to the military’s power, the military has only attempted to influence
politics on one occasion. This occurred in 2007 when a military general authored a statement on
the military’s website denouncing the AK Party’s nominated candidate for president. While the
military did attempt to influence the politics of the civilian government, this would not be
considered an intervention. No matter how consolidated the military’s powers are within the
parameters of constitutional reforms, the military will never cease to be a large and influential
body within the country, and thus will continue to have an opinion on the outcome of civilian
decisions. Instead, it is the military’s actions, which should be monitored closely.
Apprehensive about the impending election of Abdullah Gül for president, the Chief of
General Staff, Büyükanıt authored a memorandum on the military’s website in an attempt to use
this informal mechanism of influence to express concern for the weakening secularism in
Turkey. This apprehension is most said to have come from the image of Gül and Erdo!an’s
wives, both of whom wore headscarves and would be the first visible women to wear a headscarf
since the founding of Turkey in 1923. 237 Despite the similarities between the AKP and
Erbakan’s Welfare Party in 1997, the AKP held their ground and responded by stating that the
Chief of General Staff was constitutionally answerable to the Prime Minister.238
Under threat so much like Erbakan’s party was the last time a political party with Islamic
ties was in office, the AKP refused to lose its nerve and stood its ground. In order to prevent the
military’s plan for a potential coup, elections were brought forward from November to July.
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When faced with a choice between AKP and the military, on 22 July 2007 the population voted
with outstanding approval of the AKP, giving the ruling party 46.7 percent of the vote.239 The
party’s ability to increase “its share of votes from 47 to 49.9 percent in the 2007 and 2011
general elections respectively,”240 understandably worried the military. Their victory left no
question about the public’s preference and forced the military ‘back into their barracks.’ This ememorandum was a moment for significant change in Turkish civil-military relations and clearly
subordinated the military to civilian orders. Despite their concerns, the military would not be
able to get rid of the AKP due to their overwhelming public support.
Evaluation of Military Action
An absence of military intervention in politics since the implementation of Turkey’s
constitutional reforms seems to demonstrate their effectiveness. The reforms, which have been
institutionalized, have removed all of the military’s institutional mechanisms of power. Despite
these reform packages, the military may still use non-institutional mechanisms such as speeches,
engagements with the media and postings on its website to attempt to influence politics.
However, the outcome of the 2007 e-memorandum incident would seem to indicate that the use
of these mechanisms will not be successfully at unjustly swaying political outcomes and does not
endanger civilian power.

Evaluation of Hypothesis One
After reviewing the contents of Turkey’s constitutional reforms aimed at consolidating
civilian control over the military as well as evaluating the behavior of the military establishment
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since the implementation of these constitutional reforms, it would appear that the implementation
of constitutional reforms may explain a lack of military intervention in politics. The military’s
single attempt to test the waters and exhibit their opinion in politics in 2007 has proven that the
military’s opinion has little salience with the Turkish population today. Given that the posted
statement resulted in no public protest or change in outcome of the election it was challenging, it
would appear that the military’s move was entirely unsuccessful. Furthermore, the lack of
another attempt of political influence or control after the 2007 incident would indicate that the
military has realized the ineffectiveness of this behavior. Given my previous analysis, I believe
that hypothesis one presents a strong explanation for a lack of military intervention in politics.
The findings of hypothesis one are significant because they suggest that military’s
respond to constitutional reforms. The Turkish military accepted constitutional reforms and acted
within the parameters of their legal rights, even when they were significantly reduced. Since the
Turkish military has exhibited this kind of respect of the law, it makes it reasonable to believe
that other military traditions might behave similarly. Therefore, countries that are wishing to
consolidate their democracy through the separation of the military and the government may look
toward constitutional reform as one of their policy options.

Hypothesis Two
My second hypothesis examines the impact of an increased capacity of the civilian
government to punish military disobedience as an explanation of why the military has not
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intervened in politics during the AK Party era. My second hypothesis states: when there is
likelihood and capacity for the civilian government to punish the military for disobedience, the
military will not intervene in politics. I will assess whether or not punishment has had an impact
on the military’s tendency to intervene by evaluating the effectiveness of trials of military
officials.
Trials of Military Officials
Since it is clear that the Turkish military has historically viewed itself as the guardian of
Atatürk’s reforms and principals, particularly secularism and Turkish nationalism, it would seem
almost certain that the military would have intervened when the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) came to power. This would seem especially likely when referring to the post-modern
coup in 1997 where the military worked to remove Erbakan and his Islamist Welfare Party from
power. The military did attempt to influence political decision in 2007 with the previously
described e-memorandum, calling upon the population to act against the election of Abdulluh
Gül for president. In recent years, several coup plots were uncovered which made plans to
indirectly remove the AKP from power by creating widespread social discontent towards the
party. These discovered coup plots have resulted in the trial of military officials in the Ergenekon
and Sledgehammer trials. In addition the AKP has moved to try military generals who were
responsible for the 1980 coup and the 1997 incident for unlawful actions. The recent movement
to directly punish military officials for disobedient behavior has led me to believe that the
likelihood of punishment could explain a lack of military intervention.
Originating from Peter Feaver’s application of agency theory to the study of civil-military
relations, it would seem that there would be an inherent connection to an increase in the
civilian’s capacity to punish or monitor the military establishment and the military’s decision not
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to intervene in politics. Within the time frame of the AKP ruling governments, the military has
been held accountable for their actions for the first time in the country’s history. In addition to
implementing numerous constitutional reforms in order to address previous military immunities,
the AKP government has been the first civilian government within Turkey to try the military for
its disobedience. These trials have cost the military credibility as well as the ability to use
various informal mechanisms for influencing politics. While the military previously used public
speeches, press conferences and posts on their online website to command a response from the
public, their loss of credibility will undoubtedly hinder their ability to rely on public support for
intervention in politics in the future.241
Constitutional Amendments allowing Military Trials
Although they were previously mentioned in the evaluation of hypothesis one, it is
important to re-focus attention to three constitutional reforms which targeted the military judicial
allowances that previously allowed the military establishment to remain exempt from judicial
review or prosecution for disobedient behaviors. One of the key reforms that have targeted the
military’s role in the judiciary has been the abolishment of State Security Courts. Before these
courts were abolished in 2004, the Turkish military was able to act as judges to civilian
behaviors. Civilians could be tried in the State Security Courts for crimes, which were perceived
to challenge the territorial integrity of the country, the Republic itself or democratic order in
addition to crimes, which involved the internal and external security of the state.242 These courts
were historically used by the military to dissolve Islamic political parties or movements in
addition to trials of Kurds said to be involved in the Kurdish separatist movement.
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Two other crucial constitutional reforms were the subject of the High Military Council to
judicial review, and finally the annulment of Article 15 in 2010. Article 15 of the constitution
had previously granted coup leaders immunity of prosecution.243 Without these three key
constitutional reforms, the government would not have been able to carry out any military trials
for military officials.
Military Trials
In recent years it has become known that the military possessed several plots for potential
coups to overthrow the current government. Through investigation, these plots have led to long
trials and the imprisonment of hundreds of both active and retired military officers during the
Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials.244 These trials have imprisoned hundreds of junior
and senior military officers for their attempted plans to create chaos among the public that would
justify a military coup against the AKP government.245 There are 103 suspects charged with the
involvement of the 1997 post-modern coup plots alone.246 However, the validity of evidence for
these plots is hotly disputed among domestic and international circles.247
The Ergenekon investigations began in June 2007 when 27 hand grenades were
discovered in a “shanty house” in Istanbul that belonged to a retired, non-commissioned officer.
Later, diaries of a formal Naval Forces Commander, Admiral Özden Örnek revealed several
coup plots under the names of Blond Girl and Moonlight. Land and Air Forces as well as the
Gendarmerie Commanders would have carried out these coups. Other operations with the aim of
overthrowing the AKP government were found under code names of Sea Sparkle, Glove and
Cage; these plots were planned by military members, which perceived the AK Party as being a
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threat to the secularist nature of the Republic.248 The Ergenekon plots were numerous, making
them difficult to trace and obtain clear information, but were intended to carry out several
different events, which would inspire disconfidence in the AKP among the Turkish population.
Among these are said to be false flag operations by ultranationalist secularists in order to
discredit Islamic groups, the bombing of mosques, the take down of a Turkish jet and even a
possible attack on Greece.249
Ergenekon has become the largest and most controversial legal case in recent Turkish
history. Over 300 people were charged with being members of the organization, which attempted
to overthrow the Islamist government. As of the EC Report in 2012, the number of defendants
was 279 and 65 of these individuals were currently under arrest.250 During the first court hearing
on Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials on September 21, 2012, 324 suspects of an original 365 were
sentenced to 13-20 years imprisonment on charges of “attempting to remove or prevent the
functioning of the government through force and violence.”251 Among the individuals convicted
were three former army commanders.
Balyoz is noted as the most significant of the military’s plans against the AKP. The
activities that were planned included the bombing of mosques during Friday prayer, planning
forged terrorist attacks, attacking museums, initiating a conflict with Greece and assassinating
various political figures. All of these potential plans were to be carried out to create enough
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chaos within the country to justify the military’s intervention.252 In this Sledgehammer case, 195
members of the military have been accused of involvement in plotting a coup in 2003.253
The AKP has also pursued trials of those involved in the 1980 and 1997 coup plots. The
two surviving generals of the 1980 coup plot face life imprisonment for their crimes – the most
severe sentence in the Turkish judicial system.254 Their charges are related to attempting to
change or eliminate the Constitution to override the mission of the Parliament. Generals Evren
and Sahinkaya’s sentences are still pending. Trials of individuals involved in the 1997 postmodern coup plots are ongoing as well.
In recent months, many of the individuals who have been imprisoned as suspects in the
Ergenekon related coup plots have been released in connection to changed detention laws which
have limited the duration of detention awaiting trial from ten years to five years.255 Among those
individuals released were retired General Ilker Ba"bu!, previously the chief of Turkey’s armed
forces. He has since placed commentary on the unjust procedures of the court’s trials on his
personal website, undoubtedly as an attempt to gain support from the Turkish population about
his position.256 In addition to Ba"bu!, were 37 other individuals awaiting trial over the
Ergenekon coup plots including more military officials. While the newly instituted detention law
is another step towards further democratizing the country’s judicial system, it is unclear how this
could affect the state ability to hold military officials accountable for their disobedience, if their
behavior could be transparently validated.
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The trials served to diminish the military’s credibility among the population. According
to opinion polls conducted by Gallup from 2008 to 2013, confidence in the military has
particularly decreased among urban Turks, who it seems have taken the military trials more
seriously than their fellow rural Turks. In 2008, both urban an rural Turks had similar opinions of
the military, with 84% confidence among rural Turks and 80% among urban Turks. Confidence
of the military decreased in connection with the discovered coup plots from 2010 to 2012, hitting
an all time low of 69% confidence among the urban population and 66% confidence among the
urban population in 2012. Interestingly, in 2013, confidence in the military institution increased
to 81% among the rural population while confidence among the urban population continued to
decline reaching an all time low of only 59% confidence.257 It is not entirely clear what could
account for this change, but it would seem that the military trials have had a greater and lasting
impact on urban citizens than on rural citizens. This could relate to the proximity of the urban
population to the court proceedings, or because of a greater draw to the military service from the
rural regions of the country.
In addition, the request for early retirement of many military officials as well as a number
of formalized resignations along with a number of serving generals being imprisoned for their
involvement in the coup plots allowed the civilian government to intervene in military
appointments. Specifically, in connection to the coup plots, the AKP blocked the promotion of
General Bekir Kalyoncu, a high-profile commander in Turkey by forcing his retirement from the
service.258 Having remained one of the military’s continuously autonomous powers, despite the
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country’s various constitutional reforms it allowed civilians the chance to exercise their oversight
in these decisions.259
Evaluation of Military Trials
While these court cases have allowed the civilian government an unprecedented
opportunity to end military tutelage in the country once and for all, many criticisms on the
proceedings of these trials call into question the significance and effect of the trials as a means
for the consolidation of civilian authority.
As noted in the EU’s 2011 and 2012 Progress Reports, “the amount of secrecy in the
investigations, restrictions on access to certain evidence referred to in the indictments, the failure
to give detailed grounds for decisions on pre-trial detention, and the excessively long and catchall indictments have raised concerns about the rights of the defendants and the fairness of the
trials.”260 Most concerning, has been the expansion of investigations rapidly and the judiciary’s
acceptance of evidence only from the police force or supplied via secret witness. Furthermore,
the 2013 European Commission progress report criticizes the duration of judicial detentions on
the behalf of individuals accused in relation to the Ergenekon plots.261 This issue was settled in
the passing of a judicial reform bill, which limited the maximum detention period for suspects
from ten years to no more than five years.262 By July 2012, the commission noted the 404 active
military personnel, which were involved in the ongoing proceedings as suspects. 207 of these
individuals were currently in detention, including the Chief of General Staff.263 However, overall
the commission noted progress in the consolidation of civilian oversight, highlighting the
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parliamentary investigation of past military coups and legislative amendments as steps in the
right direction.
The various issues which have arose with the trials of military leaders have served to
create an equal amount of distrust between the military and the civilian government. Many
scholars have also noted the level of fabrication that has been discovered in relation to the cases.
“From the outset, the indictments against the accused ran to thousands of pages… some of the
evidence adduced to support the prosecutors’ claims had clearly been fabricated.”264
Furthermore, some have questioned whether or not Ergenekon even existed.
Evaluation of Hypothesis 2
While there is a degree of evidence which would seem to suggest a connection between
military punishments and a lack of intervention, the fact that the trials are ongoing and that there
have been significant criticisms about the validity of the trials makes it impossible for me to
validate its relationship to non-intervention at this time. As was mentioned previously, the
European Commission has noted significant problems with the trials of convicted military
officials such as a lack of transparency in the evidence that was found, a failure to give detailed
explanations of judicial reasoning during sentencing and the use of numerous catchall
indictments. All of these factors have led to concerns about the fairness of the trials and the
rights and protections of the accused military officials. In addition, many of the military officials
who were suspects in the coup cases have now been released from jail based on new laws, which
have limited the period of legal detentions. It is unclear at this point in time what will happen
with the accusations posed against these individuals.
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While these court cases have effectively allowed for an increased civilian involvement in
mechanisms of punishment such as retirements and demotions, as well as for discrediting the
military’s overall image, no proven evidence has been verified to indicate the success of
implementing these “punishments” for disobedience.265 However, even though I cannot
definitively note the applicability of this hypothesis, I feel that there is still a strong possibility
that the trials have affected military actions. In the future, more research could be conducted in
order to make more definitive conclusions. In particular, re-evaluation of this hypothesis should
include an analysis of the evolution in rhetoric on the topic of punishment among governmental
and military leaders. Research limitations including a lack of knowledge of the Turkish language
and no access to archives possessing data from the years 1996 and beyond prevented me from
evaluating these measures in this project.

Hypothesis 3
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In my final hypothesis, I will evaluate whether or not a perceived duty to protect the
identity of the nation can explain military intervention in politics. My third hypothesis states:
when there is a threat to the identity of the nation, the military will intervene in politics to protect
the national identity of the country. I have examined whether or not identity of the military and
the nation has affected whether or not the military will intervene by evaluating the military’s
perceived role as military officers as well as what is perceived by the military to be a security
threat.
Military Perception of Institutional Identity
Since the creation of the Republic, the Turkish Armed Forces have played an
instrumental role in defending the secular nature and Kemalist principles of the Turkish
Republic. Historically, the military has not hesitated to intervene whether in the form of a coup
d’état or the indirect form of speeches and political pressure when it feels that the current
government is moving too far from the Kemalist principles or secularism. Given the Turkish
Armed forces role as protectors of the Kemalist regime, historically they did not hesitate from
intervening in the political sphere when they felt that the identity of the nation was being
endangered by a sitting regime.
While not a perfect categorization of the Turkish military, the military’s perception of its
own identity is probably best explained through the research of Amos Perlmutter who has
characterized various regimes within the Middle East as praetorian. Perlmutter further classified
these praetorian militaries, and the Turkish military would seem to fall in the category of the
arbitrator army. Throughout Turkish history the military has held a respect for social order, have
had no desire to maximize army rule, quickly return to their barracks after the discretion has
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passed and have a concern for the development of the military’s professionalism.266 To
characterize the Turkish military further, they have always been the guardians of the Kemalist
vision for Turkey, in a sense, “the military has acted as a guide to usher Kemalist principles to
full realization.”267 Looking at the history of Turkey’s military, it is easy to see a connection
between the three military coups that have taken place, and a coinciding concern for the threat of
the nation.
Further evidence of their determined identity within the Turkish state can be viewed
within the laws that have been a part of the Army Internal Service Laws. Since 1935 Article 34
of the Internal Service Law required that the military be constitutionally obligated to protect and
to defend the Turkish homeland and republic. The interpretation of this clause is what has
allowed the military to intervene when the politics of the country have, in the military’s opinion,
served to weaken the Republic. This was later changed within the 2010 referendums, re-defining
the role of military service and explicitly stating that members of the Turkish Armed Forces may
not engage in political activities.268
The military seemed to act as a coherent body for a long period of time, but as stated
previously, the military’s fractional nature began to become apparent in the soft-coup of 1997.
Today scholars have noted two different personalities within the military establishment that have
played a role in military responses to civilian decisions. The first and most dominant, is the
conservative traditionalists and the other, the progressives. The conservative traditionalists tend
to view the military as the ultimate guard of the regime, or, the status quo. They believe that it is
within their responsibility to protect the Republican regime, nationalism, and the primacy of
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security over politics and secularism. In contrast, the progressives tend to see the army’s mission
as a responsibility to guard and protect an ongoing modernization of the nation, even if it could
mean change for the military itself.269 However, it is important to note that the general
institutional goal does not change between groups, only the degree of cautiousness that each
displays in relation to identity and/or security concerns. The differences between these two
personalities have determined military response to civilian decisions. One could say that the
increase in progressives within the military have allowed it to allow the civilian regimes more
room to determine political outcomes on their own. As the Turkish military continues to include
younger elements of the Turkish population, it is likely that the progressives in the military will
allow for an increased cooperation between the military and civilian government.
Evaluation of Military Identity
While I cannot definitively attribute military identity as having a connection to the lack of
intervention during the AK Party decade, I feel that the identity of the military seems to
demonstrate a connection to military decisions. Turkey’s long military history in addition to its
foundation through military achievements has a connection to its perception of its own identity
and the role that they should play within the country. The change in the meaning of the Internal
Service Law demonstrates the changing role of the military over time as well as the military’s
previous commitment to creating a means to protect the Republic from civilian regimes at their
discretion.
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Military’s Prioritization of National Security Threats
The Turkish military’s presence in politics has also been dependent on how the military
perceives internal threats to security. The most prevalent security threats, which have triggered
military involvement in more recent history, have been separatist Kurdish nationalism and the
rise of Political Islam.270 Kurdish nationalism and their separatist movement are considered to
threaten the “territorial integrity” of the country and political Islam threatens the secular
foundation of the Turkish republic. For both of these reasons, military intervention in the
political realm has been justified under the constitution until more recent history. The Kurdish
issue and role of Islam in society will continue to play a role throughout Turkish history and play
important roles in the military coup d’états of 1960, 1971 and 1980.
For many years, the military has been able to have autonomous control over which
national security concerns are most pressing for the country, therefore determining what issues
the military would devote its resources to. This was done through the National Security Policy
Document, a document often referred to as the “Red Book,” because of the sensitive nature of
the information within it.271 The document historically identified the military’s perception of
national threats and designed policies to deal with them.272 The document previously allowed the
military to dominate the security agenda because the document was prepared by the office of the
Chief of the General Staff and the National Security Council without the necessity of review by
the parliament.273
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Since the AK Party’s election, the party has worked to redefine the national security
threats of the country. This process has become known as the party’s “desecuritization” policies.
The Party’s desecuritization policies focused on resolving issues with its neighbors through a
“friendly neighbor policy;” which then helped the government to decrease security threats as
well as to decrease the military’s role in politics.274 In the past this document has focused on the
threats of political Islam and separatist Kurdish nationalism in addition to the relationships with
hostile neighbors such as Iraq, Iran, Syria and Greece. However, efforts to remove these tensions
have removed “trump cards” previously used by the military to interfere in politics. For example,
while the focus of the National Security Policy Document in 2005 made special reference to
PKK terrorist groups and political Islamic groups as domestic threats, in 2010, political Islamic
groups were excluded from the document, indicating the party’s success at refocusing security
concerns.275
Evaluation of Security Threats
The National Security Policy Document has been use by the Turkish military as a means
of controlling the security agenda of the country. In this sense, their perception of their identity
and role of military leaders as the guardians of Kemalist principles has guided their national
security concerns depending on which threats appear to challenge the Kemalist nature of the
country. This would explain the reappearance of the Kurdish separatist movement and political
Islam movements as the most concerning threats to the nation. These threats connect the Turkish
identity to military behavior.

Evaluation of Hypothesis 3
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After reviewing the military’s perception of their identity as well as which security
concerns they feel are most important, as expressed through the National Security Policy
Document, it would appear that identity may explain military response to civilian governmental
decisions. It can then be assumed that the military uses their perceptions about their identity and
the identity of the country in order to determine whether or not the nation needs their protection.
In turn, this measure of whether or not they need to save the nation has determined military
reactions to the civilian government’s decisions. Determining that identity plays a factor into
military behavior is an important realization for policymakers to note when forming policy
relating to democratic consolidation. Knowing what variables can trigger a rise in military
“protectionary” behaviors can allow policymakers to be sensitive around certain subject areas,
and to look for new ways to frame issues so that they do not trigger military behavior which is
unbeneficial to their goals. This phenomenon can directly be seen throughout the AK Party’s
leadership when they were conscious about removing their outright connections with Islam and
waiting for further popular support before enacting laws and reforms which pertained to religious
freedoms.

Review of Findings
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In this project I have examined three possible explanations for military non-intervention
in the AK Party era. After examining constitutional separation, punishment and national identity,
I was unable to find one variable that was more explanatory of military non-intervention than
another. Each hypothesis lends valuable new insight to civil-military relations as an aspect of a
country’s path to democratic consolidation. Hypothesis one can adequately describe a possible
explanation for the lack of military intervention in Turkey. Constitutional reforms, which were
introduced between 1999 and 2010, have effectively prevented the military from accessing
institutional means of influence, which had been used by the establishment since the foundation
of the Republic to affect policy change. Given that all of the possible factors of influence were
addressed, and the fact that the military has not intervened in the affairs of the civilian
government, there is no doubt that constitutional separation can be an explanation of nonintervention in Turkey.
While hypothesis two has the least amount of evidential support for being an explanation
of non-intervention, its explanation cannot be ruled out because of research limitations, which
could allow more evidential explanation. In addition to research limitations, this explanation
cannot be properly evaluated until all of the trial proceedings are completed. Inconsistencies, a
lack of transparency and a lack of demonstration on behalf of the AKP government to hold all
military officials to a fair legal standard poses further difficulties for the determination of this
hypothesis. While the trials have been indeed decreased military credibility among the
population, it is unclear how much of an effect this has had on the military institution and their
future behavior.
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Hypothesis three can also provide an insightful explanation for a lack of military
intervention in Turkey. Turkish history as well as the National Security Policy Document has
demonstrated the military’s perceptions of security threats as well as their role in the Turkish
government. A re-definition of security threats has allowed the AKP to regain control over which
threats should be deemed issues of national security. This has prevented the military from
involving themselves in conflicts with the Kurdish nationalists on a daily basis as a means of
increasing their influence in politics.

Limitations of Research
While I believe that my hypotheses have the potential to shed light upon concerns of
civil-military relations within Turkey, I recognize that the limitations of my research prevent me
form reaching any definitive conclusions. The biggest limitation that I experienced with my
research was a lack of the Turkish language, access to archives and my inability to gather field
research from the country. In order to gain a deeper understanding of all three of my variables, I
would have liked to examine the rhetoric of military officials as well as government officials
more closely in order to determine attitudes of both the military and the government. By
analyzing the rhetoric of these two actors, it would be possible to note shifts in attitudes and
statements, which were made in order to try to influence the Turkish population. Addressing
these boundaries to this research project, I would like to seek the opportunity to research this
topic again in the future when I am able to overcome some of these larger research boundaries.
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Future Research
While it is not discussed in this project, in further research I would like to re-examine the
idea of identity, but separate national identity and territorial identity as two separate explanations
of military behavior. Within my research I gained a strong sense that the behavior of the military
was strongly tied to issues of identity, however, I think that this particular explanation is twofold. The military have seen themselves as the protector of the Turkish Republic and Kemalist
principles, causing sensitivity in relation to forces, which could challenge the basic tenants of
Kemalism. In particular, this applies to political Islam. On the other hand, another very important
aspect of Turkish identity relates to the Kurdish nationalists within the country. These groups
have challenged Turkish identity but not in the same way that political Islam has. In contrast, the
Kurds, and particularly Kurdish separatist movements such as the PKK pose a unique threat to
the territorial integrity of the country by calling for the creating of a separate Kurdistan. Turkey
has been sensitive about their land ever since the founding of the Turkish Republic and still
continues the maintenance of their territory to be extremely important. Since the Kurds will
continue to challenge the territorial integrity of country, their role in the explanation of military
behavior should not be under-estimated.
In addition to developing the connection between territorial integrity and military
intervention in relation to the Kurdish separatist movement, I would like to evaluate the impact
of European Union reforms on the ability of the Turkish government to achieve the constitutional
reforms that have increased the civilian oversight of the military establishment. While this was
not one of my evaluated variables, it would appear that the EU has played a fundamental role in
the AKP’s ability to pass all of their effective constitutional reforms. Although these reforms
directly targeted the powers of the military, because the changes were necessary in order to
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increase the chances for getting into the EU, the military could not move against them. Since
accession into the EU would be the ultimate installation of Kemal’s principals and intentions for
the country, the guardians of Kemalist principles couldn’t possibly interfere with this goal. Given
the amount of reliance these various reforms have had on the EU, it is unclear if they would have
been achieved without the goal of EU accession. In addition, the longer Turkey waits for EU
accession, the less the country will be inclined to work towards accession. If the government
indeed decides to give up the bid toward EU accession, it poses a question of what actions the
Turkish government will pursue instead. An absence of the EU could lead to behavioral changes
of both the military and the government, making the issue important for consideration.

110

Conclusion
Significance of Findings
The most significant aspect of this work has been filling a gap where little research has
been able to fill until this point. Aside from research conducted in Latin America, scholarship
has not sought to determine factors of non-intervention in the region of the Middle East. In
addition, while many scholars have looked toward Turkey as an example of democracy in the
region, none have thought to focus on the country’s civil-military relationship as a means of
explaining their success. It is important that future scholars do not underestimate the importance
of civil-military relations for determining different systems of governments. By determining that
constitutional reforms and the identity of the military and the nation most likely impact the
likelihood of military intervention I have identified measures that other nations can take in order
to increase civilian oversight on the military. By determining that it is likely for the military to
have a respect for the law allows policymakers to look toward constitutional reforms as an
effective way to decrease military capacity. In addition, by confirming identity of the military
and the nation as a precondition for military intervention can alert governments to possible
triggers these flares of military control. By knowing what triggers military insecurities, civilian
leaders can determine methods to work around their concerns, preventing them from feeling
various insecurities which can precede intervention. These findings in relation to the study of
civil-military relations are so significant because of the degree of an impact this relationship can
have on a country’s ability to democratize.
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Policy Implications
Recognizing civil-military relations as one of the most important factors of democratic
consolidation in the most recent wave of democratization helps policymakers to identify
necessary aspects of focus in order to achieve their consolidation goals. Only by knowing the
largest obstacles for democratization will a country be able to determine which reforms it needs
to focus on implementing and warning signs for weak governmental policies, etc. This paper has
identified three possible explanations for non-intervention: constitutional separation, punishment
and national identity. These explanations offer three different areas that consolidating countries
may look toward in their decisions about what constitutional reforms are necessary. While all
three variables may not apply to another country’s civil-military relationship, it is likely that at
least one explanation can lend valuable insights into factors for civil-military separation.
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